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ABSTRACT
Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed state.  Though Liberia’s civil 
war is officially over, war criminals are free and some are even helping run the transitional 
government under the authority of Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  This 
peace agreement calls for the consideration of a general amnesty for those involved in the 
Liberian civil war alongside the parceling of governmental functions among members of various 
rebel groups.  The drafters of the agreement claim that this was the only viable solution for 
sustainable peace in Liberia.  Meanwhile, Charles Taylor relaxes in Nigeria’s resort city of 
Calabar.  To contrast Liberia, Sierra Leone took the brave step of implementing the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone when it realized that its peace agreement-which had similar goals and 
structure to Liberia’s- was a failure.  Sierra Leone’s decision signals a desire to begin the 
transition to rule of law and the end of rule by impunity.  Sierra Leone can be a model for 
Liberia.  This Comment revisits the colonial period in Liberia to track the growth of a culture of 
impunity.  This rule by Liberian elites, without answering to their own people, has directly 
caused a failure of the Liberian state.  I suggest that a Special Court for Liberia, instead of less 
punitive transitional mechanisms, would create a hands-on approach to building the respect for a 
tradition of rule of law and justice in a country that lacks such a tradition.  If the intervention of 
the transitional government of Liberia and the international community is at the level of the 
exercise of elite power instead of at the level of reconciliation among the masses (which is where 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement focuses its energies)-through the use of punitive 
mechanisms such as prosecution in a hybrid court of law, Liberia can begin to end the culture of 
impunity and ring in a sustainable peace.  In pursuing this goal of the implementation of the 
Special Court for Liberia, the CPA would need to be revised to reflect the concerns expressed in 
this Comment.  Primarily, a revised CPA must reject amnesty for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity as was done in Sierra Leone.

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INTRODUCTION
Liberia is the classic portrait of a failed state.1  Today, Liberia is one of the world’s 
poorest countries.  According to World Bank indicators, 46% of its population is below the 
poverty line compared to 37% for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa; the population of Liberia is 
generally undereducated, with a literacy rate of 44.1%; and Liberia faces a debt that cannot be 
realistically repaid.2  Two civil wars have left an estimated 200,000 people dead, created at least 
250,000 new refugees, and displaced approximately 350,0003.  This state of affairs did not arise 
overnight, and contrary to popular opinion, Liberia’s situation is not a result of deep rooted 
ethnic hatred or poverty.  These are only some of the symptoms of a bigger disease: the deadly 
effects of African governance in general and the Liberian culture of impunity in particular.  
The development community seems to have missed the historical lesson of the impact of 
colonialism on the post-colonial state by pretending that Band-aid measures such as 
“democracy”, development, and human rights promotion alone will cure all of the problems that 
plague failed and weak states in Africa.4 Yet, the reality is that states in Africa will not function 
properly until elites are held accountable, i.e. encouraged to rule over citizens rather than 
1 JOHN-PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE 224 (2004).
2
 World Bank, Liberia at a Glance (2004) at http://worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/lbr_aag.pdf. (last visited 
March 7, 2005).
3 STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN 
AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 315 (1999); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003:  Liberia (2003) 48 at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa7.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, World Report 
2003:  Liberia (2003)]; CLIFF BERNATH & SARAH MARTIN, PEACEKEEPING IN WEST AFRICA:  A WORLD REPORT 3 
(Refugees International 2004), available at http://www.refintl.org/files/2992_file_PK_WestAfrica_Jun04_v2.pdf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2005). 
4
 The development community continues to insist on the promotion of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights 
promotion in exchange for aid.  But African leaders do not necessarily follow through on their declarations to work 
towards these goals.  As an alternative, David Leonard argues that Africa is in need of “effective development 
management” instead of more aid.  DAVID K. LEONARD & SCOTT STRAUS, AFRICA’S STALLED DEVELOPMENT:  
INTERNATIONAL CAUSES & CURES 37-38 (2003).  Achieving this effective development management involves four 
different types of management behavior—public policymaking, organizational leadership, internal administration, 
and bureaucratic hygiene.  Id. 
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subjects.  Therefore, the project of democracy has to take a critical look at the culture of 
impunity that has become characteristic of African governance since decolonization.  
Instead, the dominant theme of late for addressing post-conflict rebuilding in African 
states has been one of protracted diplomacy. 5   Leonard Robinson, President of the Africa 
Society, recently suggested that ending conflict requires “patience, fortitude, understanding, the 
difficult skill of neutrality, and critically important, it requires that all parties negotiate in good 
faith.”6 In this same diplomatic spirit, commentators on Liberia’s most recent Accra Peace 
Agreement [Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA], which formally ended the Liberian civil 
war and introduced the National Transition Government of Liberia, claim that this document has 
been a diplomatic effort to end Liberia’s fourteen-year civil war.7  The same policy makers claim 
that the departure of Charles Taylor from Liberia signals the beginning of peace in Liberia.8
Yet, curiously, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has not dedicated itself to 
addressing issues of elite-sponsored violence in Liberia.  In fact, the Liberian peace agreement
recommends the consideration of a general amnesty for all those involved in Liberia’s civil 
wars9, which raises important issues about Liberia’s choice to privilege diplomacy over legal 
sanction of state-sponsored violence.  The necessity of a quick peace at the expense of a 
5 See, e.g., Symposium, State Reconstruction After Civil Conflict, 95 AM J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) (noting that after the 
Second World War, internal conflicts usually end by negotiation and concession, not by conquest or unconditional 
surrender); Interview by Robert Siegel & Michele Norris (National Public Radio) with Jacques Paul Klein, UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 2003) (describing the efforts of 
the Nigerian government to force Charles Taylor to obey the conditions of his exile in Calabar).
6
 Leonard H. Robinson, Jr., The Role of Diplomacy in African Conflict Resolution: The Case of Liberia in Context, 
19 MILLER CENTER REPORT 28, 28-32, (2003). 
7 See, e.g., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, War Is Behind Us Now:  A Report On Focus 
Group Research in Liberia 6, 9 (2004) at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1769_lr_war_100104.pdf; U.S. 
Policy Toward Liberia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations 
House of Representatives, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement of Nohn Kidau, President, Movement for Democratic 
Change in Liberia) [hereinafter U.S. Policy Toward Liberia (statement)]. 
8 Id.
9
 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, August 18, 
2003, art. XXXIV, at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_toc.html [hereinafter CPA and Accra 
Peace to refer to this document]
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sustained movement towards a culture free from the incessant cruelty of elite politics ensures that 
Liberia will not be an emblem of stability for West Africa in the future.  Given Liberia’s past 
potential for this status, this state of affairs is sad, to say the least.  
Liberia’s choice, however, was not made in a political vacuum.  The international 
community and its persistent emphasis on light-handed and diplomatic peace measures has a 
great impact on Liberia’s peace process. 10   In this vein, I argue that the international 
community’s emphasis on transitional mechanisms that focus on diplomatic measures and 
measures concentrating on the general populations of conflict states, rather than mechanisms that 
focus on swift justice through the use of criminal tribunals, places too much responsibility on 
Liberians in general and not enough blame on the elite power structure in Liberia in particular.  
Focusing on these non-punitive transitional mechanisms that grant blanket amnesties to 
dangerous characters either denies or ignores the historical, political, and economic events that 
led to Liberia’s status as a failed state.  The international community and the transitional leaders 
in Liberia have allowed for a post-conflict situation where the route to peace is completely 
divorced from history.  A discussion of the rebuilding of a failed state like Liberia can only take 
place when leaders are candid about the nature of colonial rule, the type of rule resulting from 
colonial domination, and the complete failure of African leaders to be accountable for their 
behavior.  During post-conflict rebuilding, the injustice that results is that violence will 
ultimately begin anew.  
In contrast to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Liberia’s neighbor, once had a similar agreement but 
quickly realized the grave problems with granting a blanket amnesty to high-level criminals.  
Instead of granting a blanket amnesty to war criminals in Sierra Leone, the government created 
10 See generally, Survivor’s Rights International, SRI Country Briefing:  Liberia 22 (2003) (supporting the CPA’s 
proposed creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and National Commission on Human Rights) at
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/pdfs/Liberia_report.pdf [hereinafter SRI Country Briefing:  Liberia].
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those individuals most responsible for war crimes and 
for the looting of the Sierra Leonean state.11  Sierra Leone’s choice to privilege justice over 
diplomacy is a clear sign of that country’s realization of the need to end the culture of impunity 
in Sierra Leone.  Liberia, however, has decided to continue with the status quo of impunity while 
paying lip service to democratic goals.12 This will only contribute to the culture of impunity that 
has existed in Liberia for years; Liberia is a failed state precisely because elite-sponsored 
violence continues to cause perpetual insecurity in Liberia.
Sierra Leone’s approach to justice, through its creation of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL)13 seems an apt model for Liberia given the similarities between the two countries.  
I suggest that Liberia and the international community must realize two things on the road to 
Liberia’s reconstruction.  First, pursuing a justice that addresses the causes of the weak state 
phenomena in Liberia is a crucial step on the way to peace.  This type of justice must deal 
specifically with crimes committed by Liberian elites and other higher-up officials instead of 
focusing on those who carried out the atrocities.  Second, peace (and when I use this term I mean 
simply the existence of a secure society evidenced by a long-term cessation of state sponsored 
violence and the delivery of political goods to the people inhabiting the borders within), can be 
an achievable goal through the use of legal mechanisms that promote accountability.  
Recognizing that emphasis on justice without equal commitments of military, political, 
and economic resources undermines the project of democracy, this Comment considers the 
11 See generally, website for the Special Court for Sierra Leone  at http://www.sc-sl.org/frontpage.html (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2004); Compare Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) (insisting that the amnesty provision in the Lome Peace Agreement cannot be granted 
in respect of international crimes), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm. [hereinafter 
Secretary General Report S/2000/915] with Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. IX, July 7, 1999, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html (calling for a general amnesty) [hereinafter Lome 
Accord]. 
12 See generally, CPA, supra note 9. 
13
 Secretary-General Report S/2000/915, supra note 11. 
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particular contribution of justice to post-conflict peace building in Liberia.  Part I provides a 
background for the Liberian crisis and puts Liberia’s history and the two most recent civil wars 
into context.  It also shows the similarities between Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s conflicts.  By 
providing a brief history of Liberia and its civil wars, Part II explains the emergence of the 
culture of impunity which has brought about the failure of Liberia as a modern state.  In 
particular, I suggest that Liberia has failed at protecting its people from insecurity precisely 
because these same elites benefit from a continuous insecurity and instability; for it is through 
the promotion of civil war that elites can enjoy the fruits of civil war.  After describing the two 
peace agreements that ended the wars of Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively, highlighting the 
positive aspects and flaws of these peace agreements, I argue that the peace agreement approach 
to ending civil wars and transitioning to functioning states is inappropriate for countries like 
Liberia.  The major flaw in Liberia’s peace agreement is its failure to address elite- sponsored 
violence and its granting of a general amnesty to all the perpetrators of violence.  In fact, the 
peace agreement will not only be a historical failure but a sure recipe for renewed hostility and 
the perpetuation of the culture of impunity.  
In Part III, I argue that an approach based on principles of justice, like the approach 
pursued in Sierra Leone, would be more appropriate.  I explain the framework of the SCSL14 and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that have been set up in Sierra Leone.15 In 
Liberia, no court has been alluded to and the transitional government of Liberia missed the 
opportunity to learn from the Sierra Leone negotiation process.  Still, it may not be too late to 
hold some important figures accountable.  The current transitional government might call for this 
approach or the incoming administration in 2005.  In discussing the absolute necessity of a 
14 Id. at 21. 
15 Lome Accord, art. VI, supra note 11.
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special court, I address a likely critique:  that legal mechanisms such as trials do not consider the 
delicate political situation of transitional societies or other possible routes to peace and 
reconciliation.  As a preliminary response, I suggest that the failure of this critique is that it
completely ignores the impact of colonialism on African governance and that the point of 
intervention of non-legal mechanisms- the masses or the victims of civil wars- allows elites to 
escape unscathed.  I argue instead that the new government for Liberia should establish a legal 
forum to address civil war violations.  This forum would only try those figures most responsible 
for fomenting war and looting the Liberian state.  This Comment does not, however, address the 
type of remedy, e.g. imprisonment or fine, that the forum should impose .  
A Special Court for Liberia could serve a threefold purpose.  First, this mechanism could 
further promote the campaign to end the culture of impunity in Liberia and in Africa as a whole.  
Second, international commitment to Liberia would show a definite commitment to address 
violence in Africa in an even-handed manner.  Finally, a trial of this sort could serve to prevent 
future state sponsored violence by promoting law reform in Liberia.  I recognize that the United 
States should and probably will play an important role in Liberia’s future.  The United States has 
a historical and a political duty to Liberia to serve as a guarantor of peace in Liberia just as 
France and Britain have done in conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone respectively.16
I. 
LIBERIA AND IT’S NEIGHBOR’S HISTORY OF EXCLUSIONS, GRIEVANCES, AND GREED
Before discussing the most recent Liberian peace agreement, it is crucial to discuss the 
economic, social, and political history that has brought Liberia where it is today.  One of the 
16 See, e.g., ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA:  LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU
93-95 (1989) (discussing the British in Sierra Leone); Chris Mullin, Speech at the UK Mission to the United Nations 
(Feb. 6, 2004) (welcoming the willingness of the United States to take the lead in Liberia as the French are doing in 
Cote d’Ivoire), at http://www.ukun.org/articles_show.asp?SarticleType=17&Article_ID=731. 
Scott
9
central arguments throughout this Comment is that in negotiating peace agreements, the 
development community and policy makers should not forget to examine what has happened in 
the past and try to avoid the same errors.  The policy makers who have drafted the current peace 
agreement in Liberia seem to have forgotten Liberia’s colonial history, Liberia’s history under 
Liberian leadership and the abuses committed throughout Liberia’s civil wars.  
A. Early Political, Social, and Economic History of Africa’s First Republic under Black 
Leadership
Although Liberia was never officially colonized like other African states during the 
European “scramble for Africa,”17 the ideology upon which Liberia was founded was informed 
by the same foundational ideologies justifying colonization in other African countries. 18
Liberia’s origins date back to 1822, when the settlement of Monrovia (named after U.S. 
President James Monroe)19 was established.20 Aided by the American Colonization Society and 
many other principally African-American groups, freed slaves who had long harbored hopes of 
returning to Africa began coming to Liberia as early as 1820, when the first group of about
eighty sailed on the ship Elizabeth.21 While maintaining strong ties to the United States, Liberia
became an independent nation in 1847.22
Little is known of the history of present day Liberia before its modern establishment, but 
its ethnic situation is complex.  Of the sixteen indigenous ethnic groups, no one group in 
17 See generally, ROLAND OLIVER & ANTHONY ATMORE, AFRICA SINCE 1800, 65 (4th ed. 1994).  The “scramble for 
Africa” describes the manner in which European powers pushed for the partition of Africa during the third quarter of 
the nineteenth century, WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA, 137 (1982) (describing period 
where Europeans made a grab for whatever they thought spelled profits in Africa).
18 PHAM, supra note 1, at 20.  
19 EGHOSA E. OSAGHAE, ETHNICTY, CLASS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE POWER IN LIBERIA 25 (1996).
20 PHAM, supra note 1, at 12. 
21 Id. at 5-11. 
22 Id. at 17.  
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particular has ever represented a majority of the Liberian population. 23  And, as in other colonial 
contexts, the Americo-Liberian elites were able to gain access to the lands of the indigenous 
people by negotiating land contracts in exchange for foreign luxury goods and conquest.24
Before the arrival of the Americo-Liberians, these groups previously had had contact with white 
people principally for trade purposes.25
It is now a common understanding that the Americo-Liberians (some descendants of 
freed Black American slaves and others descendants of captured Africans who were intercepted 
during their trans-Atlantic passage) founded the state of Liberia upon the perceived superiority of 
the light-skinned elite over the darker-skinned natives. 26 The only difference between the 
colonial context in Liberia and that in other West African countries appears to be that the 
founders of Liberia were Black.27 Even though the Americo-Liberians never comprised more 
than 5% of the Liberian population, they ruled for nearly forty years through an elite oligarchy 
that excluded and oppressed the indigenous Liberians. 28 In fact, all twenty-one Liberian 
presidents with the exception of Samuel K. Doe have been Americo-Liberian.29
Recognizing that the state had to have some method of controlling the indigenous people, 
the Americo-Liberians ruled through a colonial idiom of power, the indirect rule system. 30 This 
23 OSAGHAE, supra note 19; PHAM supra note 1, at 12.  These sixteen ethnic groups are divided between three ethno-
linguistic groups: the Mel, the Mande, and the Kwa.  The Mande are divided into eight ethnic groups, the Kwa into 
six, and the Mel into two.  PHAM, supra note 1, at 12.  The Mel are concentrated in the northwest of the country.  
The Kwa have historically been coastal seafearing people and were often recruited to assist European traders and 
sailors sailing in local waters.  Id.  The Mel and Mande speaking peoples had contacts with Europeans dating back 
to the seventeenth century; their chieftains traded African slaves for Western commodities.  Id.
24 See OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 29-31.
25 See PHAM, supra note 1 at 12. 
26 IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, UNILATERALISM, & GLOBAL ORDER 5, 7 
(2003). 
27 See, e.g., OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at, 28, 31, 42 (affirming the appropriateness of the use of the colonial model to 
describe rule by Americo-Liberians-a peripheralised ruling class which lacks an independent material base and 
which is consistently challenged from within as a hegemonic class).  
28 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 45-46; PHAM, supra note 1, at 14.
29
 Samuel K. Ngaima, Liberian Civil War, 27 FUTURICS 102, 106 (2003). 
30 OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17 at 190; PHAM, supra note 1, at 31. 
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was a system “where the central government would recognize the preexisting tribal [authority]
structures [by granting] local rulers control over their subjects in exchange for [collaboration]
with Monrovia,” the capital.31 Liberia’s interior territories were divided into districts with 
preexisting ethnic and cultural allegiances in mind.32  Within the districts, “the chiefs were [to 
be] chosen according to traditional custom” with final approval in the hands of a district 
commissioner.33  As long as there was no conflict with the central government, the district 
commissioners were to uphold traditional power of chiefs over their peoples.34 The primary duty
of the chief vis-à-vis Monrovia was the collection of valuable taxes and provision of free labor to 
the government.35 Even though there was moderate inclusion of indigenous people into Liberian 
mainstream society through the indirect rule system, it was not until the 1940s that the 
indigenous were allowed the benefits of Liberian citizenship.36  This social context coupled with 
declining economic prospects would soon become a major grievance for many Liberians.  
Like other colonial states, Liberia had the potential to be an economic leader throughout 
West Africa, but the government’s economic practices have led to a continual drain of the 
country’s resources.  In addition to one-sided contracts with the United States, Liberia entered 
into abusive loan agreements and contracts with several international lending institutions.37
Customs duties and tax revenues were often pledged as security for loan repayment. 38
Furthermore, coercive and one-sided dealings between Liberian elites and foreign companies, 
31 PHAM, supra note 1, at 31
32 Id.
33 Id. at 31. 
34 Id.
35 Id. at 32
36 Id.
37 Id. at 35
38 Id.
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such as granting of exclusive mineral rights, and securing loans using future customs revenues
and duty free imports, contributed to Liberia’s declining economic prospects.39
One concrete example of bad economic practice has been Liberia’s manner of exploiting 
its rubber.  Rubber has always been Liberia’s key resource but Liberia’s relationship with the 
United States has virtually ruined the potential for that resource to benefit the country.  The 
United States’ relationship to the Liberian rubber industry began when the United States became 
the world’s leading consumer in rubber, at which time it used Liberian rubber plantations to 
exploit the rubber used to meet the demands of America’s expanding automobile industry.40
However, the agreements between Liberia and the Firestone Rubber and Tire Company were not 
the fairest in their terms.41  One such agreement granted Firestone a ninety-nine year lease on a 
Liberian plantation for a $1 an acre rent for the first year and a flat $6,000 per year rent 
thereafter.42
The social and economic problems in Liberia--including its declining economic prospects 
and the inability of the elite to integrate the indigenous people-- continued from its founding 
through the 1970s, when Liberia’s problems were further exacerbated.43  Liberia reached a 
breaking point following the imposition of rice subsidies, Liberia’s staple food, in 1979.44 The 
effect of the rice subsidies was an increase in the price of rice to a sum representing more than 
one-third of the monthly income for an average Liberian family.45  The price increase sparked 
campaigns of protest and civil disobedience.  Amadu Sesay argues that the rice riots of 1979 
39 Id. at 32-41.
40 Id.at 38-39
41 Id. at 37-41; See also, OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 40 (implying that Firestone was more of an exploiter than an 
investor). 
42 PHAM, supra note 1, at 39.
43 MGBEOII, supra note 26, at 2, 11.
44 Id. at 11.
45 PHAM, supra note 1, at 76.
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marked a turning point in Liberia.46  The incident left then-President Tolbert weakened and the 
dominant political party of Liberia, the True Whig Party, split.47  In the meantime, indigenous 
political opposition quickly formed and demanded concessions, such as having the right to 
register as political parties to challenge the upcoming elections.48 When Tolbert decided to push 
back the 1980 elections, the scene was set for the coup led by Samuel Doe, an indigenous low-
ranking soldier, that would break the domination of the Americo-Liberian elites.49
B. Indigenous Rule under President Doe
Instead of reversing the course of Liberian history, the Samuel Doe regime followed suit
in 1980.  Doe did not bring democracy, equality, or long term economic stability to the country.50
Instead he became the one of the most repressive Liberian leaders in its history, ruling through 
an idiom of divide and destroy.51 Doe contributed to the ethnicization of the Liberian army by 
filling the most important military positions with people of the Krahn ethnic group (Doe’s own 
group) and purging the army of Gios and Manos.52  He also alienated other political and social 
groups by disproportionately representing Krahn and Mandingo people in government 
positions.53
Though Doe was weak as a leader, foreign support heavily bolstered his regime.  The
Reagan administration embraced him as a line of defense against the Soviets during the Cold 
46 DR AMADU SESAY, Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS: A PHOTOGRAPHIC 
EXPEDITION (1992). 
47 PHAM, supra note 1, at 76-77; OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 56-60. 
48 PHAM, supra note 1, at 76-77; OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 56-60.
49 PHAM, supra note 1, at 78-79; OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 60-65.
50 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 45-46 (citing Doe’s instigation of ethnic rivalries); OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 66 
(citing instances of political repression under Doe); PHAM, supra note 1, at 90-91 (arguing that Doe failed to 
maintain productive economic relationships with the United States, the IMF, or the World Bank).
51 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 44- 45.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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War.54 In fact, the Liberian government was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Sub-Saharan 
Africa by the time Doe was inaugurated such aid representing roughly one third of the Liberian 
government’s revenues.55  Between 1981 and 1985, U.S. economic and military assistance to 
Liberia totaled over $500 million.56  Nonetheless, Liberia’s international debt under Doe rose 
from $750 million to $1.4 billion.57 Even though the Liberian government was particularly 
repressive, the United States continued to aid Liberia to prevent Doe from turning to Libya and 
the Soviet Union.58 The support that Liberia received from the United States quickly withered 
after the Cold War.59 Some argue that it was the combination of widespread corruption, the 
decline in revenues from Liberia’s main exports (rubber, timber, and iron ore), and the cessation 
of the U.S. economic assistance that caused the out-break of civil war in 1989.60
C. The Effects of Charles Taylor’s War Without End: Civil War 1989-1997, 2001-2003
Although few writers have dealt sufficiently with the causes of the Liberian conflict,61
readily identifiable factors contributed to the first conflict in Liberia which brought Charles 
Taylor to the presidency in 1997.  The internal factors included: (1) the legacy of the Americo-
Liberian insistence on total social, political, and economic exclusion of the Liberian indigenous 
population from Liberian society; (2) the subsequent reliance of Doe on ethnic mistrust to divide 
the Liberian people; (3) natural resource exploitation without economic development; and (4) 
the proliferation of competitive warlord factions.62  External factors included the ineffectiveness 
of the international community in coming to the aid of the Liberian people earlier, the dominance 
54 PHAM, supra note 1, at 88-89.
55 PHAM, supra note 1, at 89. 
56 Id.
57 OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 74- 77.
58 PHAM, supra note 1, at 88.
59 PHAM, supra note 1, at 226.
60 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 46.
61
 Ngaima, supra note 29, at 103. 
62 Id.at 103, 106-07; Yekutiel Gershoni, War Without End and an End to a War: The Prolonged Wars in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, 40 AFR. STUD. REV. 55 (1997).  
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of ECOWAS as the only regional organization to come to the aid of Liberia, and the interference 
of contiguous states in Liberian affairs.63 These conditions allowed the half-indigenous, half-
Americo-Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor, to control the war time scene in Liberia.  
Charles Taylor’s seven-year civil war resulted in his ascendancy to the Presidency, and 
was successful for several key reasons.  First, factionalism prevented other groups from 
becoming powerful enough to win the strategic battles, and Taylor gained access to more 
resources than the other factions.64 In fact, Liberia’s resources probably provided more incentive 
to continue the war than any political goal of these factions.65  Battles were fought for control of 
areas rich in economic resources—gold, diamond, timber, iron ore, rubber, and tree crop.66
Taylor individually may have derived $75 million annually from these exports.67
Second, regional actors greatly influenced Taylor’s consolidation of power.  Countries 
that aligned themselves with the Taylor regime were also rewarded. Through Cote d’Ivoire, 
Taylor had access to bases and commercial interests.68  Burkina Faso lent soldiers.69  Libyan 
President Muammar Qaddafi also supported Taylor.70
Taylor’s 1997 victory did not successfully convert him from a warlord to a statesman.  
After several peace talks and treaties, Taylor agreed to a ceasefire in virtual exchange for the 
presidency.71  Some suggest that Taylor was voted into office for fear that he would cause more 
63 See ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 48-49 (citing the damaging of effect of interference by contiguous states); 
MGBEOJI, supra note 26, at 59-70 (discussing the critiques of ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian crisis); PHAM, 
supra note 1, at 203-206 (explaining that the foreign policy of the United States to Liberia has been one of benign 
neglect). 
64 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 66-67; PHAM, supra note 1, at 120-124, 173; Gershoni, supra note 52, at 55-76. 
65 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 47.
66 Id. 
67 Id.
68 Id. at 48.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 PHAM, supra note 1, at 173; ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 65. 
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fighting if he was not.72  But Taylor’s presidential rule was short-lived.73 Only five years after 
Liberia began a transition to peace, the country erupted once again into civil war.74  Taylor ruled 
by centralizing power through the reward of loyalists and through the intimidation of critics.75
High-ranking officials misused state power to further their own political objectives.76 Similarly, 
Taylor and his partners monopolized profitable businesses like fuel and food, and gained from 
imports. 77 State institutions, including the judiciary, the legislature, the human rights 
commission, and the commission on reconciliation, remained weak under Taylor .78
Signs of a second civil war began to show in 1999 when rebels crossed into Liberia from 
Guinea.  Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) waged war to unseat Taylor in 2000.79 In many ways, LURD 
and MODEL are new names for old factions.  LURD was formed by Liberian exiles in response 
to feelings of frustration and perceived exclusion from the implementation of the Abuja Peace 
Accords that ended the first civil war.80
72 PHAM, supra note 1, at 134.  
73 Id. at 215.
74 Id. at 182
75 Id. at 178-79.
76
 Human Rights Watch, Back to the Brink: War Crimes by Liberian Government and Rebels: A Call for Greater 
International Attention to Liberia and the Sub-region, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/liberia0402.pdf. 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2005) [hereinafter HRW Back to the Brink].
77 Jamie O’Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia, 
and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213 (2004).
78
. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003:  Liberia (2003), supra note 3, at 48. 
79
 Human Rights Watch, Liberia (2004) at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/21/liberi6977.html (last visited Apr. 
11, 2005). 
80
 Danny Hoffman, The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia:  Political Power, Military Strategy and 
Humanitarian Intervention, AFR. AFF. 103, 215 (2004).  
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D. Sierra Leone’s Civil War: Comparing Civil Wars
The origins of Liberia and Sierra Leone followed similar patterns81 and the crises of these 
countries are so intertwined that some scholars doubt that peace can exist in one locale if it does 
not exist in the other.82
Sierra Leone began as the Freetown Colony, founded in 1792 by a private group of 
British philanthropists-- the Sierra Leone Company-- as a haven for freed Black slaves.83 The 
company managed the Freetown settlement until the corporation was dissolved in 1808.84  Sierra 
Leone then became a crown colony and continued to receive assistance from Britain.  Sierra 
Leone received its independence in 1961.85
Though the beginnings and causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war are due to more than the 
encouragement of Charles Taylor, the fact that the same players have operated in both states 
suggests a strong linkage.  During Liberia’s first civil war, Taylor used Sierra Leone’s diamond 
fields in the north of the country as a source of income for his own military operation, and 
supported the new Sierra Leonean rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led 
by Taylor’s friend Foday Sankoh.86  Sankoh’s troops entered Sierra Leone on March 23, 1991, 
beginning the civil war in Sierra Leone that lasted for eleven years and resulted in the death of 
tens of thousands of people.  Sierra Leone’s civil war was primarily a war over resources.87
As a result of Taylor’s support for rebels in Sierra Leone, the governments of both Sierra 
Leone and Guinea began to organize Liberian refugees inside their borders to fight against 
81
 For a history of the eleven year civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia’s influence, see Celina Schocken, The
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 436 (2002)
82 See Levi Woodward, U.N. Report: Taylor’s Liberia and the U.N.’s Involvement, 19. N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
923, 932, 938 (2003). 
83 PHAM, supra note 1, at 156.
84 Id. at 157.
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 159-161
87 LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 69-70.
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Taylor’s NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia).88 In Liberia’s second civil war, the rebel 
group LURD was a group of Liberian dissidents composed of both Liberians and Sierra 
Leoneans who did not support Taylor’s alliance with the RUF.89 The Sierra Leonean component 
of LURD, the “kamajor militia,” fought for the government of Sierra Leone against Sankoh’s 
troops in the Sierra Leonean war, and also played a part in Liberia’s second civil war.90
E.  Abuses Committed in Sierra Leone and Liberia
Numerous organizations have documented the abuses from both wars in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia.91  The abuses committed might fall into three categories under international law: war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious human rights abuses.92  Addressing Sierra 
Leone first, abuses committed included rape, murder, abduction, and forced labor.93 All parties 
used children and youth to carry out human rights violations.94
In Liberia, there were widespread rapes, massacres, mutilation, torture, forced 
conscription of child combatants, and cannibalism. 95  Liberians committed human rights 
violations in the Sierra Leonean territory as well.96 Danny Hoffman, a cultural anthropologist 
who studied rebels and government fighters who moved in and out of the Sierra Leone and 
88
 Survivors’ Rights International, SRI Background Alert: Liberia, at
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/ms_word_files/liberiabackgrounden.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
89 SRI Country Briefing:  Liberia, supra note 10 at 10.
90 Id.
91
see Human Rights Watch available at www.hrw.org; Refugees International, available at 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/cgi-bin/ri/index; International Crisis Group available at
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm; Amnesty International available at www.amnesty.org. 
92
 The crime against humanity comprises grave offenses, such as murder, deportation, and torture as well as 
persecution based on political, racial, and religious grounds.  These crimes transcend the national boundaries and 
they violate the law of all nations.  
93
 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002, Sierra Leone (2002), at http://hrw.org/wr2k2/africa10.html (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter HRW:  World Report 2002, Sierra Leone]. 
94 See generally, Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill:  Child Soldiers in Liberia (2004)  at
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/liberia0204/, (last visited Apr. 10, 2005);  Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone:  Getting 
Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape (1999), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2005).
95
 Corinne Dufka, Liberia:  Do Not Forget the Crimes, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb 6. 2004,  at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/06/liberi7280.htm. 
96 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Back to the Brink, supra note 76. 
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Liberian wars, has explained the phenomenon of atrocities against civilians as a military tactic 
that employed the following reasoning:  “When the international community responds to African 
crises, the more atrocious the conflict, the greater the level of aid.”97 Again, this wartime 
economy profited rebels and rebel leaders more than the legitimate state econo mic system.98
In the Liberian context, some have noted the religious and cultic aspects of certain 
killings.99  Pham reports that all sides during the conflict in Liberia employed the power of 
traditional beliefs and symbols in an attempt to reinforce the morale of supporters and to 
encourage fear in opponents.100  During the first civil war, Charles Taylor cultivated the support 
of the indigenous religious cults of Liberia.101  After the first civil war, reports surfaced of ritual 
cannibalism; many Monrovians believe that even Charles Taylor participated in the human 
sacrifices.102
97 See generally, Hoffman, supra note 80, at 211-226.  Hoffman explains that the kamajor militia, Sierra Leoneon 
government fighters employed to contain the rebels during the Sierra Leonean civil war, became increasingly 
disillusioned with the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) campaign at the end of the Sierra 
Leone war because RUF fighters were rewarded with incentive packages, job training, and reintegration benefits, 
while the kamajors were not rewarded for their work in defense of the established order.  Id. The result was that the 
Sierra Leonean kamajors and Liberian dissidents formed the Liberian rebel movement LURD that led the attacks in 
the second Liberian civil war.  Id.  Hoffman sees the tactics used by LURD as much more deadly and civilian 
targeted than the attacks used by the same kamajor fighters in Sierra Leone, which for him was an indication that 
being a rebel has its pay off.  Id.
98 See LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 68-70. 
99 PHAM, supra note 1, at 64-7. Several scholars have devoted attention to ancient religious societies in Liberian 
culture.  See e.g., ELLIS, supra note 3, at 220-280 (connecting war, power, and the spiritual order).  The central 
government of Liberia has never been able to assert its control over the Poro and the Sande societies, that play the 
role in transmission of traditional lore and initiation of indigenous Liberians.  Id.  These religious cults were popular 
before the creation of the state and during the Americo-Liberian rule.  Today, even practicing Christians are initiated 
into these societies.  During his rule, President Barclay attempted to eradicate this aspect of Liberian society by 
jailing certain ringleaders.  Members of these societies have killed and consumed individuals, raided towns, and 
brought human flesh to market for sale.  In 1952 President Tubman passed a law creating a post of secretary of the 
interior charged with overseeing matters pertaining to these indigenous societies.   Yet President Tolbert, Tubman’s 
successor, President Doe and President Taylor were all initiated into these cults.  PHAM, supra note 1, at 64-7. 
100 Id. at 66.
101 Id. at 63-67
102 Id. at 67. 
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In Sierra Leone the war officially ended when the RUF signed a peace agreement with 
the Government of Sierra Leone on July 7, 1999, to end the civil war;103 but the war on the 
ground continued until 2000 when Foday Sankoh was captured and the RUF began to hand over 
their weapons.104  In Liberia, Charles Taylor agreed to meet in the Ghanaian capital of Accra to 
discuss a peace plan, until he fled when an indictment for his arrest was issued during the peace 
talks.105 Although the peace plan was implemented, Taylor is currently in exile in Nigeria.106
Recent evidence indicates that Taylor is still receiving money from his supporters in Liberia,
possibly to incite future rebellions.107
II.
FAILED STATES AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
Liberia, as a failed state, is plagued by leaders who rule through a culture of impunity.  
Sierra Leone has a similar history, and it too has been characterized as a failed state.108  The civil 
wars that plagued both of these countries were caused by a complete break-down in the elites’ 
ability to assure the security of their countries.  As a result, rebels and several governmental 
figures were able to carry out war on the ground, take control of key state resources, and commit 
grave human rights violations.  Despite years of war, both Sierra Leone and Liberia were able to 
end “official” violence in their countries through careful negotiations of peace accords with these 
rebels, elite politicians and select members of civil society.  
103
 Lome Accord, Annex, supra note 11. 
104 PHAM, supra note 1, at 167.
105
 Kathy Ward, Might v. Right:  Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court, 11 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8 
(2003)
106 Agence France Press, Charles Taylor:  Exiled but Still Pulling Strings (Oct. 21, 2003)  at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/liberia/2003/1012strings.htm. 
107
 The Analyst, Taylor’s Money Trail Raises Eyebrows (Dec. 17, 2004) at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200412170160.html.(last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
108 ROBERT I. ROTBERG, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States:  Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in WHEN 
STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 11 (Robert Rotberg ed., 2004) ( [hereinafter ROTBERG , WHEN STATES 
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In this Part I make two points.  First, the focus on negotiated peace agreements in Liberia
illustrates the problems Liberia faces as a modern state.  As Susan Ackerman has aptly stated:
“[T]he options for law reform [in states created in the aftermath of violent internal conflicts] may 
be limited by the very process that permits the state to exist in the first place.”109 In other words, 
law reform is limited by the negotiated peace.  These peace agreements place the majority of 
their focus on neutralizing rebel groups, while there is no equal attention paid to elite sponsored 
violence, the real threat to peace and stability in Liberia.  In this way, the negotiations have failed 
to account for the history that has brought Liberia where it is today.  
Second, the agreements should reflect the lessons learned in Sierra Leone.  Sierra Leone 
also initially privileged diplomacy over justice in its peace negotiations, but later took the 
important step to pursue human rights violators in court upon realizing that the Lome Peace 
Accord and other peace keeping efforts had failed.110
While the agreements offend abstract notions of social justice, the drafters of these 
agreements claim that they are the only way to end armed conflict. Yet even with this tension, 
these agreements may contain a solution to Liberia’s problems. Through careful redrafting, 
these agreements could recognize that legal mechanisms crafted to change the nature of elite 
power over the Liberian state can end the culture of impunity.
A.  Colonial Origins of the Culture of Impunity and the Failed State Phenomenon
The categorization of Liberia as a failed state, evidenced by the complete lack of security 
provided by the state for its inhabitants and its concomitant submission to a culture of impunity,
109 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Establishing the Rule of Law in WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, 211
(2004)
110
 Ward, supra note 105, at 8. 
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is directly related to its quasi-colonial origins and its neo-colonial governmental structure.111
Therefore, we cannot examine the modern state of Liberia without looking more closely at the 
colonial form of rule in Liberia.  Establishing the historical framework is crucial because even 
though a primary cause of state failure is destructive leadership112 (i.e. the avaricious policies of 
all of the Presidents of Liberia), the history of colonial rule in Liberia and the influence of the 
colonial period in Africa paved the way for the of this culture of impunity.  
Liberia is no different from the other failed states in Africa, however, in the sense that its 
leaders made destructive decisions that paved the way to state failure.  Other examples include 
President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-plus decades of kleptocratic rule that “sucked Zaire (now 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC) dry” until he was deposed in 1997.113 In Sierra 
Leone, President Siaka Stevens (1967-85) systematically plundered his tiny country and 
instrumentalized disorder. 114 President Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-91) did the same in 
111
 It is always difficult to provide a complete definition for a term that sums up so much.  Recognizing the need to 
define the heavy terminology, however, I will rely on the work of Robert Rotberg, Director of the Kennedy School 
of Government’s Program on Intrastate Conflict and President of the World Peace Foundation’s characterization of a 
failed state.  ROTBERG, WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 108 at 5-9.  First, and most importantly, Rotberg ranks states 
according to certain performance criteria.  Id. at 2.  Starting from the premise that nation-states exist to provide a 
decentralized method of delivering political goods to persons living within designated parameters, Rotberg provides 
the following performance criteria as a means to measure the ability of states to provide political goods:  (1)  human 
security (to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to 
or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human 
security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without 
recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion); (2)  codes and procedures that comprise an enforceable body 
of law, security of property and inviolable contracts, an effective judicial system, and a set of norms that legitimate 
and validate the values embodied in a local version of the rule of law; (3)  essential freedoms (e.g. the right to 
participate in politics and compete for office); and (4)  other goods such as medical and health care; schools and 
educational instruction; roads; communications networks; a money and banking system; a beneficent fiscal and 
institutional context within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals; space for the flowering of civil 
society, etc.  Id. at 2-5.  Second, Rotberg emphasizes that political goods two through four only become possible 
when a reasonable measure of security is guaranteed.  Id. at 3.  Third, a failed state is one where violence consumes 
the state, where regimes prey on their constituents, where the state has no control of peripheral regions, where there 
is a state of lawlessness that develops in the state in reaction to the state’s own criminal behavior, and where the 
state can only provide limited quantities of other essential political goods.  Id. at 5-9.  Fourth, a failed state does 
offer economic opportunity but only for the ruling elites, hence the term corruption. Id. at 8.  
112
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113 Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4, 127-40 (2002).
114 Id.
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Somalia.115 These rulers were personally greedy, but as predatory leaders they also licensed and 
sponsored the avarice of others, thus preordaining the destruction of their states.  All of these 
countries, including Liberia, have shared the experience of colonial rule, and for this reason I 
will explain how colonial rule can directly cause a state to collapse.  Liberia is a unique case of 
state failure, however, because of its origins and its particular claim of emblematic African 
democracy.
The culture of impunity that has contributed to state failure in Africa in general and in 
Liberia in particular grew directly out of the colonial institution of indirect rule.  In short, the 
colonial institution of indirect rule gave birth to the notion that it is acceptable to rule over 
people through illegitimate forms of control.116  This birth of illegitimacy during the colonial era 
has carried over into the post-colonial modern nation-state.  
The most obvious and long-lasting failure of the colonial state has been its engendering 
of modern forms of inequality- liberal government in form but class division in fact. Although 
colonialism claimed to bring civilization to the “native savage,” the post-colonial theorist Aime 
Cesaire argues that colonialism as a system of rule was not a “question of eliminating the 
inequalities among men but of widening them and making them into a law.” 117   This 
phenomenon is best illustrated through a description of the colonial mode of control:
Here, the land remained a communal-“customary”-possession. . . .The tribal leadership 
was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed 
where none had existed as in “stateless societies.”  Here political inequality went 
alongside civil inequality.  Both were grounded in a legal dualism.  Alongside received 
law was implemented a customary law that regulated non-market relations, in land, in 
115 Id. 
116
  When I use the term illegitimate I simply mean through forms not necessarily approved of by the society where 
the ruling is taking place.  
117 AIME CESAIRE, DISCOURS SUR LE COLONIALISME 37 (Joan Pinkham trans., Monthly Review Press, 2000) (1955).
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personal (family), and in community affairs.  For the subject population of natives, 
indirect rule signified a mediated—decentralized—despotism.118
The manipulation of tribal leadership and the imposition of a two-tiered system of law in African 
colonies meant that African societies were organized differently in rural areas from urban ones, 
thus producing a “Janus-faced” or bifurcated state.119 “It contained a duality:  two forms of 
power under a single hegemonic authority” where urban power spoke the language of civil 
society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture. 120 Native chiefs and 
commissioners dispensed customary justice while white magistrates dispensed modern justice to 
non-natives.121 Yet the development of the political center at the expense of the periphery meant 
that there would be no way for the rural to hold accountable the leadership developing in the 
center.
The independence of African countries was successful in the sense that African states 
finally were able to exercise their right of self-determination.122 Independence, however, failed
in two important ways:  in the manner that power was transferred to the indigenous rulers, and in
the way that it left Africa largely underdeveloped.123  Most post-colonial independent African 
states inherited from their colonial rulers, whatever their limitations, a ‘framework’ of internal 
and external security, efficient and disinterested administration, sound finance, a basic economic 
infrastructure of roads, railways and harbors, and at least the beginnings of modern social 
118 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT:  DECENTRALIZED DESPOTISM AND THE LEGACY OF LATE 
COLONIALISM 17 (1996).
119 Id at  18
120 Id.
121 Id. at 109.
122 OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17, at 266. 
123 ROTBERG, WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 108, at 21; See generally, RODNEY, 
supra note 17 (discussing the decisiveness of the period of colonialism and its negative consequences for Africa, 
principally Africa’s underdevelopment through a loss of power). 
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services in education, health, and community development.124  Yet between colonization and 
independence there was no effort made to create a legitimate core of properly trained leaders
who could then build on these colonial frameworks.
The colonial trend of developing frameworks of states instead of real states and investing 
in weak material structures characterized by mono-cultural and externally-oriented economies in 
Africa led to authoritarian rule, that facilitated the monopolization of both political power and 
economic activities by the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the successor national bourgeoisie.125
This occurred because the indirect rule system never attempted to make the center of colonial 
states accountable to territories outside of the capital.  
An example of how African states were manipulated at the expense of the masses to the 
benefit of European powers and a small elite core may be useful.  The colonial system was first 
and foremost an economic system whereby by the metropole (the colonizing state) sought an 
economic advantage through its colonization of the periphery state.126 African countries were 
industrialized during the colonial period where private foreign companies were integrated into 
African economic systems under a management system that operated to the complete benefit of 
the metropole.127
First, private companies often forced unequal exchange upon African countries, in that 
there were major differences between the prices of African exports of raw materials and their 
importation of manufactured goods.128  The colonial state could guarantee optimal conditions 
under which private companies could exploit African countries because of the sheer political and 
124 OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17, at 266.
125 LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the postcolonial state has less ability to coerce its subjects, 
leading to a heavier reliance on patronage). 
126 Id. at 10. 
127 RODNEY, supra note 17, at 149.
128 Id. at 160.  
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military supremacy of the colonizing force.129  Recall, for example, the Firestone Agreements in 
Liberia.130  Although Liberia was blessed with rubber as a natural resource, the United States 
completely controlled the industry.131  Historian Walter Rodney explains that this control was 
reinforced by a massive military presence of Americans in Liberia.132  Rodney further explains 
that the rubber production in Liberia symbolized the colonial phenomenon of “growth without 
development” where “there was growth of the so-called enclave import-export sector, but the 
only things which developed were dependency and underdevelopment.”133
Second, by the end of the colonial period, these fragile state structures could no longer 
stand without the financial support of the colonial state.134  These states had no ability to act 
independently because they were left politically, economically, and militarily weak.  Often the 
African leaders who were chosen to succeed the colonial state were no more than puppets 
installed to ensure that the colonial metropole would continue to benefit even at the end of the 
colonial era.135
Turning to Liberia, during the colonial period, Liberian elites implemented a system of 
indirect rule to facilitate easy communication between the capital city of Monrovia and the 
hinterland where most indigenous Liberian people lived.136  In many ways this indirect rule 
system implemented under Liberia’s period of black colonialism was no less patronizing and 
demeaning than European forms of colonialism.137 The Liberian elites who first ruled Liberia 
129 Id. at 164.
130 PHAM, supra note 1, at 37-41. 
131 Id. at 193. 
132 Id. at 198. 
133 Id. at 234. 
134 Id. at 225. 
135 Id. at 225. 
136 See Id. at 31-32. 
137 See generally, MGBEOJI, supra note 26, at 5 (explaining that the young state of Liberia quickly adopted the 
politics of Americanized elitism by divorcing itself from its African roots and heritage and blindly copying foreign 
norms, structures, and prescriptions of government).
Scott
27
were the colonizers, and their successors, Americo-Liberians and those of indigenous origin, 
ruled through the same colonial idioms as those employed by European colonizers.138  Under 
Americo-Liberian domination, the hinterland Liberians acted as implementing agents for the 
Monrovian government 139 .  Even after indigenous Liberians became more integrated into
Liberian society, the countryside was never developed to their benefit.  Rather, the hinterland 
was opened up solely for exploitation by foreign investors.140  A system of patronage flourished 
where access to the country’s resources was granted to a few, usually those connected to the 
heads of state or government officials by kinship lines or some other connection. 141
Appointments and promotions in the civil services, the police forces, the judiciary, and the state 
corporations became subject to party patronage.142  Liberia fits well in this description of the 
colonial influence on African states.
The question that remains is how the culture of impunity grew from this history.  I define 
the culture of impunity as the conscious decision by leaders who have inherited these weak state 
structures to turn their backs to the problems of the post-colonial state, and instead to find ways 
to benefit from impoverishment and misery of the people over which they rule. The culture of 
impunity is the particular method through which rulers, particularly those in African states, use 
the fragile post-colonial state as a personal withdrawal account without ever reinvesting.  In 
these states there is lack of punishment, investigation, or justice.  There is always the possibility 
of committing crimes without having to face punishment and implicit approval of the morality of 
these crimes.  Thus there is the idea that what is done without any punishment, can be repeated 
138 See OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 23. 
139 PHAM, supra note 1, at 59-60. 
140 OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 46.
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without fear.  Other characteristics of this culture include skimming from the state treasury, 
restricting participatory processes, and distancing of the ruling families from their subjects.143
In other words, it does not matter to these leaders that their state has in fact failed.144 Robert 
Rotberg, one of the leading scholars of failed states, explains that even when a state is weak, 
failing, failed or collapsed, ruling “families and cadres arrogate to themselves increasing portions 
of the available pie.”145  Rotberg suggests that “once greed has claimed the behavioral goals of 
actors within failed states . . .  peace is harder to achieve.”146
The reality has often been that impunious leaders do not benefit financially from peace.147
Instead, their modus operandi is violence and manipulation of state resources.  On the political 
side of state failure, leaders and their associates often subvert prevailing democratic norms, 
coerce legislatures and bureaucracies into subservience, strangle judicial independence, block 
civil society, and gain control over security and defense forces.148  Charles Taylor and other rebel 
groups did this in 1996, when they threatened the outbreak of another civil war unless the 
Liberian people elected Taylor president and his and other rebel groups to key governmental 
offices.149 Only negotiation with Taylor could replace war.150  Another element that contributes 
to complete instability in failed states is that the leaders usually patronize an ethnic group, clan, 
143 Rotberg, supra, note 113, at 127-40.
144 The characteristics of a failed state are the following:  a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control 
over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their 
own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without 
undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining 
life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; 
a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation. Rotberg, 
supra, note 113, at 127-40.
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class, or kin while causing other groups to feel excluded or discriminated against.151  Though the 
colonial state laid the foundation for the illegitimate African state, bad leaders solidify this 
illegitimacy.  Rotberg observes:  
In the last phase of failure, the states’ legitimacy crumbles. Lacking meaningful or 
realistic democratic means of redress, protesters take to the streets or mobilize along 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines. Because small arms and even more formidable 
weapons are cheap and easy to find, because historical grievances are readily 
remembered or manufactured, and because the spoils of separation, autonomy, or a total 
takeover are attractive, the potential for violent conflict grows exponentially as the states’ 
power and legitimacy recede.152
This culture of impunity as the primary symptom of state failure in Liberia developed in 
Liberia despite the fact that it was by no means a resource-poor country.  Liberia has always 
been a resource-rich country, and with the proper development of its industries the country had 
the huge potential to flourish.153 To its detriment, however, Liberian leaders such as Samuel 
Doe, Prince Johnson, and Charles Taylor have failed to remedy its weak institutional capacity,
instead preferring to support bureaucracies that have no sense of professional responsibility and 
that exist only to carry out the order of the executive and to oppress the citizens.154 It has not 
helped that the United States and the international community have dealt generously with 
successive Liberian governments even during times when it was clear that the government 
abused the funds received.155
The international economic organizations recognized this potential for state failure in 
African states.  In the 1980s these organizations promoted structural adjustment policies aimed at 
moving African economies away from state-run systems by placing businesses under private 
151Id.
152Id.
153 LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 70-71.  Leonard and Straus explain that as an enclave economy, Liberia 
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lucrative commodity in the country.  Id. 
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management and promoting deregulation. 156   Yet the IMF and World Bank quickly 
acknowledged that these purely market-oriented economic policies were not effective in 
achieving sustainable economic development. 157 This might be due party to the fact that 
mandated conditions were never enforced, causing the perpetuation of poor policies and the 
strengthening of elites.158  In the 1990s, the international community began to focus on good 
governance and democratization, key features of the rule of law, as the method to achieve 
economic development and growth.159 Organizations such as the World Bank began to define 
governance in ways that stressed the manner in which social resources are controlled to exercise 
political power and promote social and economic development.160 Similarly, the International 
Monetary Fund began to emphasize the importance of good governance as a condition to 
assistance.161 These organizations now focus their attention on the role played by governmental 
authorities in establishing a framework for economic activity and in deciding how the benefits of 
such activity are distributed.162  Even though a healthy amount of criticism exists about the goals 
of these organizations, their recent focus on governance has helped to reveal the essence of 
relations between those who govern and those who are governed in Africa.163
156 Sadaharu Kataoka, The Plight of African States and Good Governance 1 (2003), at www.ciaonet.org/wps/kas09. 
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(last checked Apr. 7, 2005).
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The possibility exists that the leaders themselves are the source of instability and violence 
in African states.  The chain that follows is simple:  the social contract that binds citizens and 
central governmental structures is forfeited when citizens believe leaders are illegitimate. At this 
precise moment, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. 164 This short 
explanation merely shows the heavy past that Liberia must face.  The remainder of this Comment 
provides an explanation for why the elite in a country like Liberia must experience a shock in 
order to move out of this post-colonial phase.
Aime Cesaire provides one perspective on how a post-colonial society should progress:  
“It is a new society we must create, with the help of all our brother slaves, a society rich with all 
the productive power of modern times, warm with all the fraternity of olden days.”165 I argue 
here that one target for change must be promotion of the reform of the elite and the conception of 
ruling and power in Africa.  Ending the era of the old-guard politicians, promoting political 
leaders who are talented, and focusing on how to change the behavior of high ranking officials 
must form the heart of the project of democracy in African countries. On Cesaire’s view, the 
dehumanizing effect of colonialism does not just create an animal out of the native but also out 
of the colonizer himself.166 Cesaire brings home the point that “no one colonizes innocently, that 
no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes” calls for its own 
punishment.167
164 ROTBERG, supra note 108, at 6. 
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B.  Sierra Leone and Liberia’s Peace Agreements:  Why the Peace Agreement 
Approach Furthers the Culture of Impunity
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that, to promote reform in countries like 
Liberia where there has been a history of state abuse, reform mechanisms should focus on the 
very actors that have historically implemented destructive state activities.  Unfortunately, the two 
peace agreements that officially ended the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia did not serve this 
goal.  Instead, the agreements created an arrangement that will continue this culture of impunity.  
As Peter Pham so aptly notes, parceling out government agencies in the name of peace “tie[s] the 
authority of leaders of the various political groups directly to their ability to let their subalterns 
exploit profitable opportunities at the expense of the state.”168 In this section, I show that 
although the peace agreements in both Sierra Leone and Liberia were nearly identical documents 
in the way that rebel groups were able to secure leadership over key governmental branches, 
Sierra Leone recognized this flaw and changed course upon failure of its agreement, ultimately 
implementing the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  To contrast, and despite recent breaches of its
agreement169, Liberia has not decided to change course. 
1.  Sierra Leone’s Lome Accord:  The First Path Taken
Importantly, the Lome Accord is not the tool that has sustained peace in Sierra Leone.170
Nevertheless, the lessons that the Sierra Leonean government learned through its negotiation 
process are considered here. 
168 PHAM, supra note 1, at 219. 
169 See, e.g., Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General On the United Nations Mission in Liberia, U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/177, 2 (citing attempts by some senior government officials to circumvent provisions of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement) [hereinafter S/2005/177]; The News, Let’s Maintain the Peace At All Costs (Mar. 21, 2005) 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200503211283.html. 
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 Secretary-General Report S/2000/915, supra note 11, Annex at 15, Agreement between the United Nations and 
the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone ; Laura Hall & Nahal 
Kazemi, Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 288 (2003) 
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The peace agreement that officially ended Sierra Leone’s eleven year civil war, the Lome 
Accord, signed in the Togolese capital Lome, was negotiated between the government of Sierra 
Leone and the RUF, Sierra Leone’s most infamous rebel group.171 The Lome Accord provided 
for the following:  (1) a cease-fire between the warring parties and disarmament of the RUF172; 
(2) complete amnesty to all combatants173;  (3) transition of the RUF into a political party174; (4) 
allocation of official control over Sierra Leone’s diamond minds to Foday Sankoh by naming 
him chairman of strategic minerals; and (5) establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.175 Significantly, the UN ultimately made a reservation that the amnesty could not 
cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.176
The Lome Accord quickly unraveled.177 The Lome Accord assured a lucrative deal for 
Foday Sankoh, the most infamous rebel leader of the RUF, under which he was given complete 
control over the mineral resources that he exploited throughout the war.178 Yet instead of 
hastening peace, there were reports that Sankoh was again encouraging breaches of the 
agreement.179 Reports surfaced that the RUF continued to participate in the killing of UN 
peacekeepers and the capturing of others even after the signing of the Lome Peace.180 Some say 
that it was only the capture of Foday Sankoh and his subsequent death that saved the situation on 
171 Lome Accord, supra note 11.
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173 Id. at art. IX 
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the ground.181 Therefore, though the Lome Accord diplomaticaly sought  to end the war by 
negotiating with rebel groups, this sequence of events suggests that it was not the negotiation that 
ended the hostilities, but rather the mere fortuitous death of the lead rebel.  
As part of the peace process, the government in Sierra Leone held public workshops and 
conferences with civil society engagement, helping to incorporate policies specifically 
addressing the needs of the Sierra Leonean people on their journey to reconciliation.182  From 
this process, the people of Sierra Leone implemented a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.183
Though some commentators were skeptical about the TRC’s ability to fulfill its mandate due to 
administrative, staffing and financial difficulties, the TRC has been successful.184 Currently the 
government plans to implement the recommendations of the TRC report, disseminate the report, 
and set up a war victims’ reparation fund.185 Some have commended the TRC commissioners 
for their creation of a child-friendly version of the report, noting that this is the first time in the 
world that a child-friendly version of a Truth and Reconciliation Report has been produced.186
Finally, the Sierra Leonean government went one step further than the Lome Accord and 
the TRC.  Upon realizing that the Agreement did not go far enough to remedy elite violations, 
Sierra Leone entered into an agreement with the United Nations to form the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, with the special mandate to try those most responsible for the violations during
181 PHAM, supra note 1, at 166
182
 International Center for Transitional Justice, Statement by International Center for Transitional Justice, at
http://www.un-ngls.org/cso/cso3/security2.html (June 22, 2004)[hereinafter ICTJ, Statement].
183
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Sierra Leone’s war.187  Sierra Leone’s choice to include justice in its peace process is discussed 
later in this part.  
2.  Liberia’s Path to Peace?:  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
As it stands, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [hereinafter CPA] for Liberia 
articulates the structure and scope for a transition government to prepare Liberia for democratic 
elections in 2005.188 The National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) led by Chairman 
Gyude Bryant, a respected Liberian businessman, is scheduled to operate for two years from
October 14, 2003 to October 25, 2005, at which time elections will be held for the next Liberian 
President.189  The mandate of the NTGL will not expire until January 2006, when the next 
elected government of Liberia will be inaugurated.190
The most important provisions of the agreement are:  (1)  the call for a total and 
permanent end to hostilities between the Government of Liberia, MODEL and LURD;191  (2)  
establishing ceasefire monitoring and ensuring the security of senior political and military 
leaders;192  (3)  United Nations Chapter VII International Stabilization Force to support the 
implementation of the Agreement; 193  (4)  United States support for security sector 
restructuring; 194  (5) establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 195  (6) 
establishment of a governance reform commission to review the existing program for the 
187
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Promotion of Good Governance in Liberia;196  (7) authorization for LURD and MODEL to 
transform into political parties;197  (8) provision of twenty-four of the seventy-six seats of the 
National Transitional Legislative Assembly to members of LURD and MODEL; 198  (9) 
allocation of key ministries to warring parties;199 and (10) consideration of recommendations for 
general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the 
Liberian conflict.200
In form and structure, the CPA resembles Sierra Leone’s Lome Accord.  However, 
several aspects of the road to the CPA indicate that Liberia’s future might not resemble that of 
Sierra Leone’s.  The NTGL faces particular challenges due to the conflicts arising as to the 
composition of its personnel and its substantive goals as outlined by the CPA.201  Though the 
agreement strives to strike a balance between the preexisting government in Liberia, the two 
major rebel factions, LURD and MODEL, and “civil society,” it is difficult to see how future 
violence will be averted given the division of political power and the partition of control over 
Liberia’s resources as outlined by the Agreement.  
In general, this agreement strikes only at the manifestations of Liberia’s general sickness: 
the culture of impunity.  Because the agreement does not strike at the heart of the cause of 
insecurity and violence in Liberia-- irresponsible elite control-- there is no hope that this 
agreement will render any long lasting solution for Liberia.  More specifically, these negotiations 
are doomed to fail for at least four reasons.  First, the CPA is just one in a line of similar peace 
196
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agreements in Liberia’s history that have failed,202 and there is no indication that this agreement, 
especially with so much control designated to rebels, will be any different.  Second, the mere fact 
of rebel exercise of control over key sectors and resources is an indication that this agreement is 
doomed.203 Remember Sierra Leone.204 Third, the possibility of a general amnesty205 for those 
who participated in the Liberian wars is the most serious flaw.  On the one hand, the amnesty 
could be a diplomatic concession to rebels for the sake of maintaining a fragile peace.206 On the 
other hand, there is no way for the fragile peace to be maintained when the real perpetrators are 
allowed to exist in society without confronting their wrongs in some acceptable way.  Finally, 
there seems to be no real participation of ordinary Liberians in the negotiation of the peace 
agreement under which they are to live.
a.  Liberia’s History of Failed Peace Agreements
Signed on August 18, 2003 in the capital of the West African Republic of Ghana, the 
CPA comes on the hills of several peace agreements that have been negotiated in Liberia’s recent 
history.207 Between 1990 and 1997, there were thirteen major ECOWAS (the west-African 
economic and peace keeping organization) sponsored agreements. 208 With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear that these initiatives have repeatedly and tragically failed.209 The reasons for 
failure are many.  Some commentators have suggested  that these agreements failed because they 
did not meet the needs and interests of Liberia’s warring factions and their leaders, much less 
202
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those of the civilian population.210 Others have presented views suggesting that Nigeria’s role in 
ECOMOG-- the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS-- contributed to the failure of these agreements 
and prolonged the civil war because it ceased to be “an impartial peacekeeping force and had 
turned into just another combatant.” 211 .  Finally, some have suggested that Taylor’s 
determination, with the backing of the strongest rebel group, to capture the capital city of 
Monrovia and ultimately the presidency could not be averted by any peace process.212  Although
a combination of all these factors contribute to continual failure of Liberia’s peace process, this 
last view is of fundamental significance.  Again, securing the presidency does not only mean 
Taylor’s ascendancy to Head of State; rather, seizing territory means securing commercial 
alliances and creating economic opportunities.213
The first set of agreements, including the Banjul peace plan and the Yamoussoukro 
agreement, were largely crafted by Liberia’s civil society groups.214   Their mandate was to 
establish a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, which would supervise a cease-fire and establish an 
interim government.  During this first round of negotiations, none of the faction leaders were 
allowed to join the interim government.215 The Yamoussoukro agreement differed from the 
Banjul peace in that it attempted to balance the Nigerian dominance with more francophone 
support through Senegal in the peace negotiation process.216
These first negotiations failed for many reasons, but primarily because there was 
absolutely no negotiation with the factions involved.217 At this time Taylor and his forces grew 
stronger, and he refused to support the efforts of ECOMOG at peacekeeping if he could not be at 
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the negotiating table.218 Furthermore, these early accords gave too central a role to the Nigerian-
run ECOMOG.  The factions would not agree to a peace because they believed that ECOMOG 
acted partially during the peace process.219 At this time ECOMOG did not have the support of 
other West African countries because of its Nigerian dominance nor did it have the support of 
Liberian rebel groups.  
In stark contrast to the first round of agreements, the July 1993 Cotonou Accord220 and all 
of the peace agreements since have attempted to move away from this ECOWAS-dominated 
diplomacy by ringing in the era of power-sharing agreements.221 ECOWAS leaders and the 
United Nations employed the simple reasoning that by accommodating the aspirations of the 
armed factions, peace would be achieved at a faster pace.  
This plan, like the others, quickly unraveled because an increase in the number of rebel 
groups made it increasingly difficult to satisfy all rebel desires.222 Because of the sheer number 
of rebel groups at the negotiating table, it became more and more difficult to coordinate a policy 
for ending war in Liberia especially, when the rebel groups benefited economically by taking 
control over key resources in Liberia-- resources that were often in concentrated geographical 
areas that were easy to pirate.223 Seen in this manner, the Cotonou Accord ultimately failed 
because the power-sharing regime did not recognize that the factions had vested interests in 
maintaining instability rather than moving towards peace.224
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Even after the failure of the Cotonou Accord, in 1994 ECOWAS still believed that the 
only way to bring peace to Liberia was to include warlords in the government.225  There was 
hope that the Abuja Accords would not present the same failures as the earlier accords for three 
reasons.  First, Abuja attempted to improve on Cotonou by first assuming that inclusion of the 
factions was the first step in direction towards peace and that the next logical step would be to 
assure a well-run disarmament program.226  Second, it was assumed that political power could be 
exchanged for military peace.  Since Taylor’s faction suddenly befriended ECOMOG, it was 
thought that the peace process would no longer be threatened.227  Finally, optimism came from 
assuming that because the faction fighters had become weary of fighting, evidenced through 
voluntary disarmament, there would now be peace.228
The future of the Abuja Accords looked bleak, for several reasons, soon after they went 
into effect.  Liberia’s security situation remained weak, due to the mobilization of armed groups 
in support of rival warlords; 229  following ECOMOG’s departure, Liberia’s borders were 
weakened;230 Taylor’s opponents viewed the state apparatus as a mere extension of his own 
personal power;231 and Taylor himself still had the mentality of a warlord.232 The Abuja Accords 
were ultimately misguided by way of their indulgent characteristics. A major flaw has been the 
increasing willingness to cede power to the factions in the executive arm of the transitional 
government without demanding accountability for continual breaches of the agreements 
themselves.  These same flaws are obvious in Liberia’s latest attempt at peace.
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b.  Members of the NTGL:  Rebels Turned Politicians
The allocation of seats in the NTGL shows that peace negotiators have caved to the 
rebels in a more frightening manner than in Sierra Leone. 233   The outgoing government, 
designated in the CPA as one of the three warring parties, currently has five of its ministers in 
key government positions, while the two most notorious rebel groups hold a combined seven key 
positions in the transitional government:  agriculture; commerce and industry; finance; foreign 
affairs; justice; labor; and land, mines and energy.234  Other political parties and civil society 
organizations hold six seats.235 Yet the main concern of former government members of the 
NTGL and members of LURD and MODEL seems to be securing jobs for themselves during the 
2005 elections instead of forging a sustainable economic, political, and social future of 
Liberia.236  The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) in Liberia, Jacques 
Paul Klein, has reported that Chairman Bryant often acts at the whims of the rebel politicians,
making it difficult for him to address human rights abuses and institutional reform.237
The provision of seats to rebel leaders seems to be a complete windfall for human rights 
violators.  Law professor Ikechi Mgbeoji condemned the transformation of violent rebel groups 
into political parties when the first Liberian civil war ended.238  First, he argued, the global 
community too easily accepts the idea that mere elections are the cornerstone to stability.239
Second, Mgbeoji argues that the metamorphosis of violent rebel groups into political parties at 
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the insistence of the international community promotes the culture of coercion and corruption.240
More specifically, this amounts to society’s acceptance of noncompliance with the law, 
glorification of the use of arms to gain power, and failure to hold rebels and government leaders 
accountable for their criminal conduct and human rights violations against the masses.  
Additionally, and possibly more harmfully, this attention to the desires of rebel groups 
serves as a decoy that diverts attention from the root cause of insecurity in the first place-- bad 
leadership.  When the international community continues to focus on rebels and factions, they 
miss the opportunity to meaningfully alter post-colonial African leadership.  
c.  General Amnesty:  A Curse Unto Itself
The possibility of general amnesty241  is one of the most serious flaws of the CPA.  
Besides the fact that the granting of a general amnesty is a diplomatic way of encouraging rebels 
to participate in the peace process, there are several theoretical and practical problems with this 
form of concession. 242   The possibility of a general amnesty in the Liberian context is 
problematic legally, politically, and morally.  First, the state of the legality of amnesty in the 
Liberian context is unclear under international law.243  Given that the determination of whether 
to grant amnesty involves an extremely contextual legal decision making-process, there has been 
no real determination by policy makers in Liberia that a blanket amnesty was the most 
appropriate option for this context.  Although it is not decisively clear that international law 
prohibits general amnesty for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
240Id at 26, 37.
241
 CPA, art. XXXIV, supra note 9. 
242
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other serious violations of international law, it is clear that the United Nations has consistently 
maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted for such acts.244 Additionally, Human 
Rights Watch has spoken out against this type of provision, and has that impunity for crimes 
under international law must end and that there can be no amnesty for such crimes.245 Second, 
amnesty alone is a dangerous formula for peace because of the messages it sends to elites, to 
rebels and to society that crimes can be committed and civil wars staged with no consequence for 
any of the parties involved.  Finally, the blind granting of amnesty does not consider the moral 
hazards of dismissing the role of punishment of the main perpetrators.  A lesson should have 
been learned from the Sierra Leone case.  There the United Nations ultimately rejected the idea 
that a blanket amnesty could be granted for violations of international law including war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.246
d.  Participation of Ordinary Liberians
While commentators on the CPA highlight the complex nature of the new role that the 
agreement affords for Liberian civil society organizations, there is no indication that the voices 
of ordinary Liberians were present in the negotiation of the peace agreement or in its current 
interpretation.247 Instead, the CPA seems to have been born from the negotiations between 
ECOWAS, the President of Ghana, and a Nigerian mediator.248  Observers of the peace process 
have encouraged what remains of Liberian civil society to improve citizens’ understanding of the 
Accra Agreement as a means of engaging the participation of all Liberians in the transition 
244
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process.249  Similarly, the International Center for Transitional Justice has argued that “a rule of 
law strategy must be rooted in local conditions, and developed with local civil society.”250
Furthermore, outreach should move beyond the capital so that members of the larger Liberian 
community can begin to have faith in the new systems put in place.251  There is no indication, 
however, that organizations have attempted to move beyond Monrovia to teach Liberians about 
the peace agreement.  
Even the participation of Liberia’s civil society has been criticized.  On the one hand, 
civil society’s new place in both the legislature and the executive branches takes civil society 
beyond their traditional roles as advocates, educators and watchdogs.252  In this way, Liberian 
civic leaders can promote democracy in government from within.  On the other hand, those civil 
society organizations that wish to maintain their independence and traditional watchdog role are 
weary of an insider civil society that will be confronted by the realities and temptations of 
political life.253
e.  Predicting Failure:  Sierra Leone Has It Right
Several factors indicate that a negotiated peace with no mechanism for accountability will 
fail and that Liberia too should be urged to pursue a Special Court like the one created in Sierra 
Leone.  I will address this in detail in Part III.  First, now that the peace process is well under 
way, there have been accusations that the transitional government has let down the Liberian 
people through its inability to ensure their security.254 Continuous reports detail lack of every-
249
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day control over ex-combatants and Liberian citizens in general.255 Even with a negotiated 
settlement, ex-combatants have expressed unwillingness to disarm without the promise of
jobs. 256   Therefore, the reintegration portion of the Disarmament, Reintegration, and 
Rehabilitation Program is increasingly a worry given the country’s 85% unemployment rate.257
In Sierra Leone, the disarmament process, with the help of the British, took place at a much 
faster pace.258  These incidences highlight that negotiated settlements do not always secure peace 
for a fragile, failed state.  This occurs because the agreements are not addressing the root issues.  
Some will observe that the CPA will establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to 
provide a forum to address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences. However, this will not extend 
far enough to develop a clear picture of the past and to facilitate genuine healing and 
reconciliation. 
III.
THE JUSTICE APPROACH TO ENDING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
The negotiators of peace in Liberia chose to privilege diplomacy over justice in their 
attempt to move Liberia out of its civil war period and into a period of stability.  In making this
choice, they have also rejected the use of justice to achieve stability.  This choice partly stems 
255
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from fear that punishment will only lead to more violence and instability.259 The arguments 
against using the least punitive mechanisms possible (like negotiated peace agreements similar to 
Liberia’s) to address war-torn societies are abundant and forceful; however, these interventions 
do not fully consider the historical situation presented in this Comment.  In this Part I argue that
targeting the masses or the rebel groups as the site of intervention during transitional periods 
misses the point that the elites need the curing, not the masses. Addressing the needs of victims 
and focusing too heavily on disarming members of factions ignores the bigger problem, one that 
Sierra Leone has recognized.260
In this regard, a Special Court for Liberia would be the best option for Liberia for at least 
three reasons. First, Sierra Leone’s approach to transitional justice, with its creation of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, attests to the importance of using justice to assure accountability.  In the 
years following Sierra Leone’s civil war and the establishment of the mixed tribunal, there are 
signs that the society is beginning to institutionalize the culture of human rights, and the political 
scene has moved away from impunity.261 Second, there is modest empirical evidence that 
prosecution of elite actors can play a role in changing the calculation of political actors in 
transitional states such as Liberia which could have a tremendous effect on future politics in 
Liberia.262 Third, a hybrid court for Liberia would allow it to rebuild its own justice system and 
259 U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, supra note 7, at 37 (statement Nohn Kidau).
260
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to address crimes that were specifically Liberian in nature, thus moving the country forward.  
Finally, given the fact that there have been prosecutions of war criminals in similar situations in 
other countries263, there seems to be a moral call for justice in the Liberian context as well.  
Furthermore, the United States holds a unique relationship with Liberia that will allow it to easily 
facilitate this process.264
I first address the example of Sierra Leone and the promise that it represents for the 
possibility of a court in Liberia.  Next, I briefly survey the challenges to the establishment of a 
Special Court for Liberia.  These challenges relate to the type of model that should be used 
during transition periods to ensure peace and stability and the practical challenges to 
implementation and securing legitimacy.  These critiques generally insist that the criminal law 
model as the primary manner to promote rule of law compliance is not useful.  First, these 
critiques insist that to achieve peace and reconciliation in society, political carrots such as 
amnesty, truth and reconciliation commissions or traditional forms of dispute resolution should 
be used.  Second, when it is suggested that more punitive mechanisms such as tribunals should 
be used, the response is often raised that there is no way to insure legitimacy through externally 
influenced trials and that the costs of punitive mechanisms such as trials are prohibitively 
expensive.
corruption could be part of an effort to locate and repatriate corrupt proceeds deposited abroad.  Id. at 188.  In my 
opinion, the repayment of stolen funds would be an apt remedy for crimes that fall under the culture of impunity that 
I have described here.  Rose-Ackerman further argues that “a criminal law system based on fines and restitution 
would take on many of the characteristics of the civil liability system.”  Id.  Punishments other than imprisonment 
are a very viable option for actors like Charles Taylor.  
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Instead of challenging the efficacy of less punitive mechanisms of transitional justice, I 
suggest that a Special Court for Liberia would create a hands-on approach to building the respect 
for a tradition of rule of law and justice in a country that in theory purports to have such a 
tradition but in practice completely lacks such a tradition.  The ultimate goal of a Special Court 
for Liberia would be to address the ever-rising culture of impunity that continues to damage the 
prospects for peace in Liberia.265  My position is that by focusing on the perpetrators of the civil 
wars-- those who planned and implemented the civil wars-- a society can begin to raise the cost 
of this type of political culture, thus changing the long-term behavior of politicians.  In pursuing 
this goal of the implementation of the Special Court for Liberia, the CPA would need to be 
revised to take into account the concerns expressed herein.  I would strongly argue that this type 
of structure would need to be conditioned upon the rejection of a blanket amnesty for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity as was done in Sierra Leone; this would require an amendment or 
modification of the CPA. 
A.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  The New Path Forward
Upon the failure of the Lome Accord at the hands of persistent rebels and the desire to go 
further than the mandate of the TRC, the people of Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leonean government, 
and the United Nations combined efforts to create and to implement the Special Court for Sierra
265
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Leone [hereinafter, the “SCSL”].266  Though the primary players in the creation of the Special 
Court have been the government of Sierra Leone, the United States and the United Nations, the 
Special Court has been assisted by local civil society organizations that contribute to the court’s 
outreach function.267  Some would suggest that this strong support amongst both the Sierra 
Leonean people and in the United Nations for the court’s establishment has been one of the main 
reasons for its perceived success amongst Sierra Leoneans.268
The SCSL is a unique mechanism for war crimes law enforcement.269  The SCSL was 
created as an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, with the specific mandate 
to bring to justice those “who bear the greatest responsibility” for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law, committed in the territory of Sierra 
Leone since November 30, 1996.270  The Court’s main focus will be to try those who held 
leadership and command positions, i.e., those who planned and instigated attacks. 271   The 
government and civil society of Sierra Leone have concluded that lower level perpetrators of 
human rights violations and victims of these violations will have their opportunity for justice 
through Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 272   The SCSL has indicted 
266
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thirteen people for war crimes, including former Liberian president Charles Taylor273 and former 
Sierra Leone government minister Hinga Norman.274  The surviving indictees are being charged 
with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.275
The Special Court is more flexible than a fully international court because the Court can 
apply both international law as well as Sierra Leonean law,276 allowing the Court to address 
crimes specific to the Sierra Leonean conflict.  Yet the reach of the Special Court is limited to 
the national courts of Sierra Leone and does not extend to the courts of third states.277  Unlike 
Sierra Leone, the Rwanda [ICTR] and the Yugoslavian [ICTY] Tribunals were mandatory in 
nature because the United Nations determined under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter 
that the wars in those countries were a threat to international peace and security. 278   The 
implications of this distinction will be discussed infra.  
The Court has issued a number of precedent-setting decisions on international law, 
including a ruling in 2004 that heads of state are not immune from prosecution before an 
international court.279  Crimes under Sierra Leonean law are limited to offences relating to the 
273
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abuse of girls and damage to property under two Sierra Leonean statutes.280  This ability of the 
Court to decide cases under Sierra Leonean law reinforces Sierra Leone’s rules of law alongside 
the international rules that will be applied.  
Some would argue that the most pressing issue facing the court relates to its financing 
mechanism.  The government of Sierra Leone is unable to contribute in any significant manner to 
the operational costs of the Special Court, which means that the Court relies primarily on 
contributions from non-governmental sources.281  Institutions created by the Security Council, 
such as the ICTR and the ICTY, are funded by scaled assessments, in which each country's 
contribution is proportionate to its size and wealth.282   However, because the United Nations did 
not directly establish by the SCSL, the Sierra Leone court will be financed through voluntary 
contributions. One of the major obstacles for funding the Court is its ability to collect the funds 
that donor states have pledged.283
Yet it is highly unlikely that the international community will let this effort fail.284  By 
the end of 2003, the United States, through its USAID program, provided the Special Court a 
total of $15 million to pursue its operations.285  The organization’s rationale for support of the 
Court is that the nation’s fragile peace will depend heavily on sustained external support.  
280
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Furthermore, given the United Kingdom’s unique connection to Sierra Leone,286 British aid for 
Sierra Leone is more than likely.
The critiques of the SCSL have been offset by its promises.  The hope is that trials taking 
place in Freetown will send a powerful message to the people of Sierra Leone that justice is 
being done within the framework of the rule of law.  There are signs that these goals are being 
achieved.  The special court has trained local attorneys and sent teams to explain legal concepts 
to villagers, soldiers, and students.287 Additionally, the simple fact that the SCSL has indicted 
Charles Taylor sends the message that Sierra Leone is committed to changing its legal landscape.  
B.  Dominant Methods of Addressing the Aftermath of Violence, Just as Many 
Unanswered Questions and Possibly the Wrong Target:  Amnesty, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, and Traditional Mechanisms for Peace and Reconciliation 
in Liberia
The problem of how many and who to punish, and an ethic of reconciliation and 
forgiveness, permeate discourse on international peace and justice.288 Professors Laurel Fletcher
and Martha Minow have considered the question of why countries address past episodes of mass 
violence, and the goals they seek to achieve.289  These goals include:  (1) discovering and 
publicizing the truth; (2) making a symbolic break with the past; (3) promoting the rule of law 
and strengthening democratic institutions; (4) deterrence; (5) punishment of perpetrators; and (6) 
healing victims and achieving social reconstruction.290  As part of the discussion on which of 
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these goals should be privileged over others, there is a growing debate as to whether trials are 
useful in the reconciliation process at all.291
Although I discuss both the utility and the problems with trials in the next section, I offer 
first that in arguing for less punitive measures, some scholars and policymakers question the 
effectiveness of law in promoting peace in these ruined societies.  First, some suggest that
although trials have the potential to be effective and efficient, there is no hard proof that they
actually promote rule of law goals or peace.292  At worst, trials may detract from rule of law 
goals because they lead to further instability in the country.293  This is so because trials focus on 
punishing instead of bringing about economic justice and political change.  Second, some 
suggest that trials as an exclusive means to promoting peace and justice do not deal adequately 
with the need for all members of a society to be reconciled. 294 Finally, trials and other 
reconstruction efforts are too expensive, considering the amount of infrastructure and training 
needed to get them running.295
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In response to the disadvantageous aspects of trials, transitional justice scholars focus 
primarily on three types of less punitive mechanisms.296 Scholars have offered alternatives such 
as amnesty in exchange for truth and reconciliation, or using traditional courts and other 
traditional dispute mechanisms to dispense more quickly with less serious violations.  The use of 
these mechanisms suggests that, to move from a society of violence and to rehabilitate the 
masses, the society and the international community must promote mechanisms that target 
society at large instead of individual perpetrators. 297 I address these arguments in turn.
1.  The Amnesty as a Transitional Mechanism:  Too Many Unanswered Questions
Currently, the CPA calls for the consideration of amnesty for crimes committed during 
the civil war in Liberia.298 Amnesty is the decision by which a society decides not to prosecute 
the wrongs of a predecessor regime or insurgents during the regime.299 As an alternative to 
punishment, amnesty attempts to assure that transitions will happen peacefully.300 Professors 
Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly cite three reasons why a transitional government might sanction an 
amnesty.301   First, nascent governments may make the political calculation to grant amnesty to 
gain the support or acquiescence of outgoing officials.302  Second, amnesty may result from a 
calculated conclusion that doing nothing is better than doing anything. 303   Finally, a new 
296 See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in Transitional 
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(noting some serious deprivations of due process rights in the gacaca system and recommending amnesty to assist in 
reconstruction); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 288, at 573-639 (recommending an ecological model for social 
repair); Jennifer Widner, Court and Democracy In Postconflict Transitions:  A Social Scientist’s Perspective On the 
African Case, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 64 (2001) (noting the importance of neighborhood and local forums in postconflict 
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government might be unable to pursue other methods to reconciliation for lack of political or 
economic resources thus causing a de facto amnesty.304
The dominant critique of a general amnesty, as opposed to a limited amnesty, however, is 
that it capitulates to past perpetrators and does not honestly attempt to move a country 
forward.305  The danger of amnesty, from this perspective, is that it can easily cause a society to 
slip into a culture of impunity.306  Sarkin and Daly argue that this may occur if “amnesty 
confirms a lack of accountability and of responsibility—if it denies the wrongfulness of the prior 
regime’s actions and, ultimately denies the fact of those actions.”307 Undoubtedly, supporters of 
amnesty will point how, in South Africa, the TRC used the promise of amnesty to obtain some 
information about past crimes; it is generally believed that the TRC achieved more truth than 
would have been possible otherwise.308 I do not challenge this notion here.  Yet in South Africa, 
the political and social environment was more conducive for amnesty than in countries such as 
Sierra Leone and Liberia.  
I suggest that a second fatal problem with the granting of a general amnesty is that no 
consensus exists on when amnesty should be granted and when it should not.309 There are 
reasons why amnesties work in contexts such as South Africa but might not be as helpful in 
countries with a history like Liberia.  Even those who argue that amnesty could be a positive 
mechanism to achieve societal reconciliation are firm in the suggestion that there are two 
requirements that must temper the granting of amnesty.310  First, amnesty should always be 
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individual and not general.311  Each applicant should submit voluntarily to the terms of the 
amnesty and a blanket amnesty should be disfavored.  Second, Sarkin and Daly argue that 
amnesties should be conditional.312  In other words, there is consensus that amnesty should not 
be given away for free or in exchange for a pre-existing duty such as a duty to obey the law.  The 
CPA in its current form does not suggest a limitation on the application of amnesty.313  For this 
reason, this provision of the agreement should not be followed.
2.  Truth and Reconciliation Commissions:  The Wrong Target
The CPA also calls for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.314
Truth commissions are institutions established to review an era of systematic violence and to 
provide an authoritative account of what happened.315 Amnesty International has indicated that 
such a commission may have an important role in establishing the facts and identifying those 
responsible for crimes under international law. Nevertheless, it cannot be a substitute for a court
of law to try alleged perpetrators of serious violations of international law.316
In popular culture, the South African TRC is the point of reference for those who espouse 
reconciliation and security through forgiveness as the dominant form of transitional justice.317
The South African TRC used the promise of amnesty to obtain information about past crimes to 
produce a fuller understanding of the truth of what occurred during the Apartheid Era.318 Martha 
Minow suggests that truth commissions might address mass violence in societies better than 
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trials because, designed to be a sympathetic forum for survivors wishing to testify, they are a 
more therapeutically appropriate model for victims. 319
I do not dispute that TRCs might help victims to cope with the past violence sustained by 
their communities.  But, aren’t the victims really the wrong target for sustained intervention?  
The needs of victims will be positively addressed if the root causes of civil strife are dealt with 
through a long-term strategy that addresses impunity in African states and state-sponsored or 
state-supported violence against the masses. It simply is not clear how a truth commission can 
promote reconciliation in society when the major perpetrators of violence in Liberia are at large 
or hold seats in the transitional government.  Scholars who focus on TRC effectiveness have left 
this tension unexplained.  I doubt that governance in Liberia will change when there is no 
advantage to do so, i.e. when elites are allowed to escape through the transition cracks because 
all of the transition resources are focused on victims.  My initial thoughts on why the TRC in 
South Africa was so successful boils down to the fact that South Africa was dealing largely with 
the problem of societal racism in the form of Apartheid.  Apartheid as a system of racism 
permeated all aspects of society and effected race relations among all South Africans.320  The 
entire country needed the healing effects of the TRC.  Liberia is different; not all of Liberia’s 
people act in a way to destroy the purpose of the state of Liberia.  But the elites in Liberia do. 
Additionally, several transitional scholars, including Professors Sarkin and Daly, note 
that no quantitative study to assesses the success of truth commissions.321  Because further 
empirical study is needed to test arguments for truth commissions, arguments for alternative 
models of transition as well as for trials are weakened.  In Sierra Leone, one of the problems that 
319 MINOW, supra note 289, at 70-72.
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arose over the possibility of a truth and reconciliation commission was that some individuals 
were reluctant to testify to a commission for fear that they would implicate their friends.322
Furthermore, some civil society organizations have noted that Liberia has not even begun the 
process of implementing a well run truth and reconciliation commission like the TRC in Sierra 
Leone.323 Liberia has failed to hold conferences involving the participation of members of 
Liberian society in order to ascertain their idea on the need for a commission; this might be 
because Liberian civil society, though present, is really weak.  Instead, the transitional 
government of Liberia continues to focus exclusively on the needs of rebels-turned-politicians,
despite the fact that many Liberians have expressed the view that they want Charles Taylor to be 
brought to justice in some forum.324
3.  Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute Resolution: What is Traditional?
Finally, scholars critiquing the state-centered rule of law model promote more grassroots 
approaches to addressing communal violence.325 These approaches tend to promote revitalizing 
traditional forms of dispute resolution. 326   Some have called this form of reconciliation
“restorative justice”-- a form of justice more characteristic of traditional African 
jurisprudence. 327   With this type of justice, the goal is not retribution or punishment, but 
“redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, [and] a seeking to rehabilitate
the victim and the perpetrator . . ..”328
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Professor Jennifer Widner explores the role of local forums in post-conflict transitions.329
She explains that traditional forums for dispute resolution that stress mediation and arbitration 
serve as a gap filler for the formal judicial system while lawyers are trained and courthouses are 
rebuilt.330  Widner’s main argument for greater reliance on traditional courts is that the state 
judiciary can become overburdened if too many cases are referred to them during vulnerable 
times.331  Customary and community courts, Widner argues, can establish a foundation for rule 
of law reconstruction because they have been effective in resolving ordinary disputes fairly and 
quickly.332
In Rwanda, for example, the gacaca, or village courts, have enjoyed a resurgence since 
the end of the genocide.333  The Rwandan government decided to use the gacaca courts to deal 
with lower-level offenders at a community level as a result of the country’s realization that the 
Rwandan justice system could not handle the huge number of genocide cases.334  Those who 
promote the gacaca system argue that it will have healing effects for society because it will 
provide individuals the chance to discuss the genocide, participate in the creation of justice and a 
standard of responsibility for criminal actions, and deal with traumatic events more quickly.335
Still, observers also have several reservations about the gacaca system that highlight 
more general concerns about relying on tradition and native customs in forging modern legal 
practice.336  First, gacaca was traditionally a dispute settlement mechanism for resolving local 
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disputes over family matters, property rights, and other local concerns and may not adapt as a 
criminal justice model. 337   Second, no system protects witnesses and victims, monitors the 
release of defendants, or ensures that they do not retaliate against their accusers.338  Finally, 
gacaca may not protect the due process rights of the accused.339  More recently, scholars argue 
that the gacaca process might actually contribute to the insecurity of all Rwandan citizens in the 
future, emphasizing the fact that these courts will accentuate ethnic divides in Rwandan society 
because they only try genocide crimes and not war crimes.340 Hutus will be disproportionately 
charged with crimes.  These concerns with gacaca only highlight larger concerns about 
privileging traditional practices over more modern ones.  While traditional practices ought not to
be rejected outright, we must avoid supporting practices simply because they have historical or 
traditional roots.341
Turning to Liberia, there has been no suggestion that the Liberian government would be 
willing to turn over matters of transitional justice to Liberian traditional courts, even though 
indigenous Liberians do have informal dispute settlement mechanisms.342 Additionally, the 
same problems that face the gacaca courts in Rwanda would probably face any traditional court 
in Liberia.  Furthermore, the cultural context in Liberia is different from that of Rwanda; Liberia 
has over sixteen ethnic groups and it is not clear that the people of Liberia would agree upon the 
type of dispute mechanism that should be used.  Furthermore, there were many instances of 
cross-ethnic violence in Liberia, and forcing members of outside ethnic groups to appear before 
other ethnic courts might implicate notions of fairness. 
337
 Corey & Joireman, supra note 333, at 81-82 
338
 Carroll, supra note 333, at 192. 
339
 Daly, supra note 296 at 381. 
340
 Corey & Joireman, supra note 333, at 86. 
341
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 109, at 183. 
342 GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 67 (1991); George B. N. Ayittey, The Rule of Law 
in Traditional African Society (The Free Africa Foundation), available at http://freeafrica.org/features6b.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
Scott
61
C. In Defense of Trials:  Why Punish?
Having articulated the problems with the most dominant forms of transitional justice 
mechanisms, I argue that a growing body of evidence indicates that punitive measures such as 
trials, though imperfect,  can contribute greatly to addressing the problems articulated in the 
previous section.  I have chosen to discuss the particular contribution that trials offer the Liberian 
context because of the pressing need to end the culture of impunity in a country that can be an 
example for African states struggling with similar issues of accountability.  The central point 
here is simple: if the manner in which power is exercised in societies can be changed by 
deterring those who wield the most power in society, the ethic of accountability can begin to 
permeate the greater political culture.  But, first I offer the criticisms of trials.
1.  The Modern Critique of the Use of Trials during Transitional Periods
Traditionally, advocates of trials believe that they will help communities rebuild because 
they support one or more of the following goals:  (1)  to discover and publicize the truth of past 
atrocities; (2)  to punish perpetrators; (3)  to respond to the needs of victims; (4)  to promote the 
rule of law in emerging democracies; and (5) to promote reconciliation.343 These goals are very 
similar to those articulated earlier for why societies chose to address past violence in the first 
place.  In periods of transition, Professor Ruti Teitel explains, law’s role has been to “express the 
justice of the successor regime.”344  On Teitel’s view, “trials offer a transitional mechanism for 
normative transformation to express public condemnation of aspects of the past, as well as public 
legitimation of the new rule of law.345  Trials, in this sense, focus on the individuals responsible 
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for wrongdoing.  This focus on the individual allows an express disavowal of the predecessor 
norms.  
Still, the limits of criminal trials in promoting the goal of reconciliation are no secret.  
There has been no lack of healthy criticism about the utility of trials.346 Critical scholars suggest 
that trials are not always the most productive mechanism for insuring the rule of law and peace 
in transitional societies.  Fletcher and Weinstein critique the criminal law model as an exclusive 
avenue during transitions because they believe that the emphasis on criminal trials overshadows 
other means of achieving the goal of anti-impunity for human rights violators.347  Others suggest
that pursing perpetrators will only result in more violence because the security structures in weak 
states are not strong enough to support tribunals;348 or that victims and bystanders are left 
without a means to heal because all resources have been spent on the court, in turn creating a 
desire for vengeance.349  Although a trial of perpetrators might address goals two through five
above, some scholars do not see how trials can contribute to truth telling or to healing victims.350
346 See generally Fletcher & Weinstein, supra  note 288, at 604-606 (arguing that war crimes trials do not address 
the phenomenon of collective power and its influence on individuals); Zolo, supra note 291 at 727 (arguing that 
international criminal justice does not perform the function of transitional justice because it does not take into 
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experiment in international justice); but see Talitha Gray, To Keep You Is No Gain, To Kill You Is No Loss- Securing 
Justice Through the International Criminal Court, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 645 (2003) (arguing that the 
International Criminal Court might be the only functional forum if the United States is truly committed to 
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These scholars have constructed a critical discourse on trials that focuses primarily on 
their inability to address the needs of victims.  For example, Fletcher and Weinstein argue that 
the current paradigm punishes only a few select individuals who carried out the most egregious 
acts or who commanded others to do so, and neglects to address communal engagement with 
mass violence.351
The driving force behind these criticisms is the perception of a lack of evidence of how 
trial justice contributes to social reconstruction in the aftermath of mass violence. 352 The 
particular concern is that “the theoretical foundation for international criminal trials borrows 
heavily from writing developed in a political and legal context in which such proceedings were 
mere aspirations and with no empirical data to substantiate the purported benefits of international 
trials.”353   Specifically, Fletcher and Weinstein note the dearth of studies of the effects of 
criminal trials on victims, bystanders, and perpetrators and whether these trials can affect societal 
beliefs and attitudes.354  Similarly, there is lack of evidence that the receivers of this transitional 
justice connect the trials with the establishment of the rule of law.  
2.  Evidence that Trials Might Have a Positive Effect on Political and Social Change
I have suggested earlier that there are fundamental problems with addressing only the 
grievances of victims and rebels when a society moves out of a violent period.  These groups are 
often the wrong target.  A negotiated peace agreement such as the CPA places too much 
emphasis on power sharing with rebel politicians and not enough emphasis on combating the 
culture of impunity that leads to the need for these peace agreements in the first place.  Similarly, 
Leone found that some members of Sierra Leonean society felt that a disproportionate amount of attention had been 
given to perpetrators, particularly through benefits from the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
program (DDR).  See ICTJ, Legacy supra note 291, at 10.
350
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the major critiques of trials place too much emphasis on the inability of trials to heal the wounds 
of victims355 and not enough emphasis on new evidence that trials targeted at specific individuals 
tend to affect the behavior of politicians and can have modest effects on rule of law goals.356
Before discussing recent evidence of the utility of trials, I refute the concern that criminal 
prosecutions might actually lead to more violence.  
The suggestion that going after perpetrators will only lead to more violence might be 
incorrect.357 There is no concrete proof that indictments of high level officials will necessarily 
lead to more societal unrest.  First, the object of special and international tribunals is to target a 
handful of perpetrators, not the combatants on the ground.358  It is unlikely that the security of 
Liberians will be threatened by punishing figures like Charles Taylor.  Security is an issue when 
every person that fought is rounded up and thrown into jail.  This is not what I am suggesting 
should happen.  For example, Hinga Norman (a rebel leader during Sierra Leone’s war) was 
indicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone even though he received a cabinet post when Sierra 
Leone’s elected government was restored.359  Yet his indictment did not cause serious breaches 
of the Lome Accord by Sierra Leoneans.  The concern about fragile peace is sometimes so 
overemphasized that the peace negotiation process gives factions too much leverage over the 
355 See Udombana, supra note 284 at 19 (arguing that the punishment of human rights violators is the vindication of 
the victim’s harm)
356 See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity:  Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (citing modest support for the notion that international criminal prosecutions can help to 
prevent the continuance of the culture of impunity and foster inhibitions against habitual violence).
357
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post-war reconstruction goals.  It might be the case that a strong international presence in the 
face of rebels could actually sustain peace.  
It is no longer an unproven statement that bringing war criminals to justice can send an 
important message that power does not buy immunity from charges for war crimes.360  The 
international community is only now beginning to determine the affects of the ad hoc tribunals
on violence prevention, and the effects of the Sierra Leone court will not be known for years to 
come.  Now that several years have passed since the Rwanda and the Yugoslavia tribunals, 
however, there is some empirical evidence available that prosecution can actually prevent future 
atrocities through a process that marginalizes leaders who resort to ethnic appeals.361  In the 
Rwanda and the Yugoslavia contexts, at least, this marginalization has led to the emergence of a 
more moderate political rhetoric.362
The work of scholars such as Payam Akhavan demonstrates with empirical evidence that 
trials may prevent future atrocities by instilling unconscious inhibitions against violence on 
society at large, and cautioning politicians to perform a cost-benefit calculation before 
encouraging internationally illegal activities.363  Akhavan argues that individual accountability 
for massive crimes is “an essential part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic foundation 
for a lasting peace.”364
Akhavan proceeds with the assumption that in liberal societies, the criminal law model 
presupposes some moral choice on the part of the perpetrators of criminal acts.365  Yet during 
times of mass violence, moral values get so inverted that individuals who are directly responsible 
360
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for war crimes are elevated in society to a status akin to national heroes.366  Therefore, when 
individuals are encircled in collective hysteria and routine violence, Akhavan posits that these 
individuals are not likely to be deterred from committing crimes.367
Faced with how to prevent these abnormal conditions before they occur or reoccur, 
Akhavan provides two arguments for targeting the most powerful leaders for punishment.368
First, “where leaders engage in some form of rational cost-benefit calculation, the threat of 
punishment can increase the costs of a policy that is criminal under international law.”369  The 
assumption here is that leaders would prefer long-term political viability over momentary glory.  
Furthermore, Akhavan suggests that international legitimacy is a valuable asset for aspiring 
statesmen; the stigmatization of indictment may threaten the attainment of long-term political 
power.370   Therefore, the threat of punishment may persuade specific leaders and potential 
perpetrators to adjust their behavior, thus removing “impediments to stability from the political 
stage, and provid[ing] an incentive for constructive political behavior.”371
Second, Akhavan’s hope is that punishment for international crimes will instill 
“unconscious inhibitions against crime” or “a condition of habitual lawfulness” in society.372
Through punishment of leaders, there might be a “progressive entrenchment of a more lawful 
self-conception” among the wider public.373 Through the force of “moral propaganda” from the 
implementation of international criminal justice, the international community can change the 
rules for the exercise of power.374
366
 Id.
367 Id. at 11-12.
368 Id. 
369 Id.
370
 Id.
371 Id. at 12. 
372
 Id.
373 Id.
374
 Id.
Scott
67
Two examples of how this process might work come from Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  In 
Yugoslavia, Akhavan describes how the policy of discrediting wartime leaders and the 
leadership of the Bosnian Serb Republic (the leadership before and during the Bosnian War) by 
the ICTY have allowed new leaders to emerge and to make politically moderate statements that 
would have ruined their political future in an earlier context.375  Specifically, politicians in post-
war Yugoslavia seem to be distancing themselves from the strong rhetoric of the Serb 
Democratic Party to claim a new and more moderate image.376  Part of this strategy is to clean up 
the party’s image by separating it from Radovan Karadzic, its founder and one of the leaders 
indicted by the ICTY; since the creation of the tribunal, Karadzic has become a liability to the 
party.377  Akhavan argues that the international community’s policy of using the ICTY as a 
mechanism to dispose of indicted leaders has contributed to post-conflict peace building by 
“creating incentives for political parties to behave in a more conciliatory manner.”378
Similarly, Akhavan has evidence that the ICTR has made a modest contribution to post-
conflict peace building by discrediting and incapacitating the remnants of the former genocidaire 
government in Rwanda.379 As in Yugoslavia, the ICTR, alongside the national criminal justice 
system in Rwanda seems to have exercised a moderating influence in the post-conflict peace-
building process in Rwanda.380  The new Tutsi government in Rwanda has been discouraged 
from sanctioning Tutsi revenge killings against Hutu, since the interest of the Tutsi government 
is served by distinguishing itself from the previous Hutu rulers of Rwanda.381  Furthermore, 
without the ICTR it would have been easier for the Interahamwe (Hutu forces that carried out the 
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genocide) to gain support and to launch a campaign against the successor government. 382
Instead, Akhavan argues that channeling the desire for vengeance into legal process has 
mitigated the severity of retaliatory abuses.383  Finally, the ICTR may prove to have a special 
positive effect:  the gradual internationalization of accountability in the African continent.384
In the following subsection I apply Akhavan’s ideas to an argument for a Special Court 
for Liberia.  
D.  Lessons from Colonialism, Post- Colonialism:  Preliminary Justification for A Special 
Court for Liberia
Having addressed several transitional justice mechanisms and defended the use of trials 
to promote accountability, here, I argue that a criminal trial will be of special significance to 
Liberia for three reasons.  First, a trial will focus on elite-sponsored violence, beginning the 
process of ending the culture of impunity.385 As a cautionary note, the ability to amend the CPA 
in such a way as to be non-threatening to those who are likely to cause violence should allay 
frustrations over whether the push for a trial will foster instability in Liberia.  Second, promoting 
a special court for Liberia would help crimes specific to the Liberian context and rebuild 
Liberia’s national courts.  Finally, the international community has a duty to commit such 
resources to places like Liberia because similar investment has been committed to Sierra Leone, 
a country very similar to Liberia and to other countries.386
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1.  Ending the Culture of Impunity while Maintaining a Fragile Peace:  Changing the 
Calculation of Liberian Politicians
Applying the analysis above to the Liberian context and recognizing that Liberian 
politicians have historically acted with a complete disregard of the needs of Liberian people, 
Liberia is a ripe setting to enforce an ethic of accountability.  Having Taylor at large will not 
prove helpful for Liberia’s transitional government, given his ability to dictate the movement of 
Liberian affairs even while in exile.387 As it stands, the current situation in Liberia sends a 
message that it is acceptable to rule through criminal behavior in Liberia.388 More specifically, 
in the African political context, holding those most responsible is necessary because of the nature 
of African politics since decolonization, a nature firmly rooted in the culture of impunity.389
Remedying harmful aspects of the colonial legacy in African states will do a great deal to 
increase the legitimacy of African states in the eyes of the international community.
Although there is growing critique of the state-centered method (rule of law orthodoxy) 
by which the international community addresses the goal of encouraging respect for the rule of 
law390, I posit that trials can contribute to achieving rule of law in a given society.  In the 
Liberian context, courts can play a crucial role in the country’s transformation to a real rule of 
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law system because their very presence symbolizes a break from the past political arrangement.  
Still, certain principles can be applied in any context.  Litigation in the courts allows access to 
the new democracy and as Professor Ruti Teitel argues, courts can be the guardians of the new 
constitutional order. 391   In this way, “the law expresses new norms and does the work of 
reconstruction.”392   Therefore, law does the work of exposing and delegitimizing the value 
system associated with past rule.  In a similar vein, Jamie O’Connell argues that transforming a 
political system into one that functions democratically requires a citizenry that holds government 
officials accountable.393  In countries such as Sierra Leone or Liberia, where ordinary people 
have become accustomed to abuses by the powerful, internationally-supported courts and truth 
commissions may begin to undermine this culture of impunity.394 With the proper level of 
support, a hybrid tribunal reinforced by Liberian national courts might serve the positive role of 
constructing and enforcing established human rights principles and create and enforce new rules 
specific to the Liberian context.  This is so because the judiciary will play a constructivist role 
that the transitional government cannot play because of its political weakness.  
Sadly, however, few sources have dealt seriously with the thought of accountability for 
those who have caused a continual state of instability for Liberians.  In fact, plenty of critiques 
aim at the type of intervention sought here.  Mohamed Ibn Chambas, for example, executive 
secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), rejects the notion of 
a tribunal like Sierra Leone’s for Liberia.395  He explains that “if it’s externally induced, the 
system may not be able to withstand the consequences.” 396 In Africa, Chambas explains, 
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“community bonds, loyalty to individuals are still strong.  If one rushes with certain high 
principles, it certainly won’t lead to stability.”397  Others suggest that Liberians would really 
prefer to leave these tragic events behind them and move on.398
Some organizations working in Liberia have indicated that “there is little expectation that 
any of those who have committed gross human rights violations, engaged in widespread 
corruption or looted government coffers in the past will ever be called to account.”399  To date,
commentators on the situation in Liberia have mentioned in only a general way one of three 
possible avenues Liberia might pursue for justice: referral of the issue to the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone;400 placing transitional justice for war crimes under authority of the International 
Criminal Court;401 or creating a court for Liberia.402  These commentators and policymakers have 
not fully explored the real possibility of any of these avenues.  
The predominant current moving against the implementation of judicial mechanisms to 
achieve justice in Liberia is that “the situation on the ground is by all counts still very precarious 
. . . .”
403
  This theme of the “fragile peace” has completely frozen the possibility of justice for 
Liberians by placing the future of the country at the whims of the rebels.  
Yet this fear to move forward with a special court for Liberia is largely unfounded given 
the fact of Sierra Leone.  Policymakers have only dealt with the issue of creating a special court 
for Liberia (to the exclusion of the extension of jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
or referral of the matter to the International Criminal Court) in a cursory manner because the 
397
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international community does not know the ultimate effectiveness that Sierra Leone’s court will 
have on peace in that country.404
In theory, the structure of a special court for Liberia would be similar to the one 
established in Sierra Leone.  Subject matter, temporal and personal jurisdiction of the court and 
selection of judges would follow the Sierra Leone framework.  Funding could come either from 
assessed contributions or from part of the large reconstruction budget already allocated to 
Liberia.  In February of 2004, a total of $520 million was pledged at Liberia’s donor’s 
conference, but, as of late October 2004, the transition government only received $354 
million.405 The United States pledged $200 million of this total.406
Some might argue that extending the jurisdiction of the SCSL is the simplest and fastest 
method of insuring justice for perpetrators of the most serious violations of crimes committed 
during the Liberian crisis; many of the actors that led the campaigns of violence operate in and 
out of the Mano River region, encompassing Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.  This would 
require the United Nations to grant the SCSL Chapter VII authority, the result being that the 
Court would have the authority to require Nigeria to turn over Charles Taylor.  Furthermore,
because the infrastructure is already in place, additional funding for structures is unnecessary.407
There would only be a slight increase in the number of indictees, because the charge of the court 
is to prosecute only those most responsible.  Finally, the NTGL is not presently politically or 
financially ready to install its own courts.  These arguments would suggest that the extension of 
jurisdiction might be the only real way to achieve some sense of justice.    
404
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Yet the reality is that extension of the jurisdiction of the Sierra Leone Court to cover the 
Liberian civil war would not be the most productive option for Liberia.  Jacques Klein suggested 
that the expansion of the jurisdiction of the SCSL to cover Liberia would not be feasible for both 
legal and practical reasons.408 For example, the court is special to Sierra Leone’s needs in that 
Sierra Leonean law will be applied in some circumstances.409  Also, the subject matter of the 
contract only concerns crimes committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war, not those crimes 
committed during either of the Liberian crises.410  Furthermore, one lesson from the ad hoc 
tribunals has been the utter importance of local tribunals that truly serve the citizens of the 
country where the crimes were committed.411 Those who have evaluated the effectiveness of the
Rwanda tribunal, in Arusha, Tanzania, emphasize the myriad issues that arise with this 
structure.412  For example, a noted lack of connection between the Rwandan people and court 
proceedings exists because the ICTR has not adequately publicized their proceedings. 413
Furthermore, the trial’s location in Arusha has produced witness coordination difficulties.414
Crucially, Liberia must face its past on its own turf.  
More fundamental issues face the idea of referring the Liberia crisis to the International 
Criminal Court.  First, and most importantly, only crimes committed after the entry into force of 
the Rome Statute (1 July 2002) can be brought before the ICC.415  The crimes committed in 
408
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Liberia occurred well before 2002, even though some continued into 2003.416  With such a 
limited temporal jurisdiction, some of the perpetrators of the Liberian civil war could not be 
reached through the ICC.  Second, the states most likely to commit themselves to scrutiny are 
those least likely to violate human rights.417  Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo have argued 
that “the restrictive jurisdictional regime of the ICC Statute will make effective investigation and 
prosecution by the Court very difficult as long as a situation has not been referred by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”418  Although Liberia has recently ratified the 
Rome Statute, there is no indication that it would submit its citizens to be tried.419  Finally, if 
Liberia were to submit to the ICC it could possibly lose the support of the United States,
considering that the United States does not support the ICC.420
2.  Addressing Crimes Specific to the Liberian Context and Rebuilding Liberia’s National 
Courts
A hybrid tribunal would have the additional potential to influence the pace of law reform 
in the national courts of Liberia and assist in rebuilding Liberia’s own justice system.  Taking the 
second idea first, policy makers support the idea that courts applying both international and 
national law can help a country rebuild its own justice system and to reform its laws.421 Because 
courts like the SCSL are in-country, diplomats hope the court's location will facilitate the 
diffusion of legal knowledge from international to local judicial officials, which will assist in 
416 SRI Country Briefing:  Liberia, supra note 10, at 7-13. 
417
 Akhavan, supra note 356, at 26. 
418 Louise Arbour & Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 129, 139 (Herman A. M. von Hebel, et al. eds., 1999). 
419
 Burundi (Sept. 21, 2004) and Liberia (Sept. 22, 2004) have both ratified the International Criminal Court Treaty.  
No Peace Without Justice International Committee, SOL ICC Member States, at http://www.npwj.org (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2005).  Ninety-eight states have ratified the ICC.  Id. 
420
 Irene Khan, Open Letter to the Transitional Chairman of Liberia, Urging Rejection of the Impunity Agreement 
with the USA Concerning the International Criminal Court, Oct. 21, 2003, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR340202003?open&of=ENG-2F5 (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). 
421 ICTJ Legacy, supra note 291 at 1-2. 
Scott
75
rebuilding the country’s own national judicial system.422 If a hybrid court is successful, the host 
country’s legal system can learn from its effectiveness and efficiency.  
Using the case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Center for 
Transitional Justice identified the three activities that it hopes will take place:  (1)  substantive 
law reform (drafting of new legislation to update old laws and bringing Sierra Leonean law into 
compliance with its international legal obligations),  (2)  professional development (development 
of relationships between international legal expertise and local legal professionals), and  (3)  
raising awareness of the court as exemplary of an independent and well-functioning criminal 
court (introducing the concept of the court and creating awareness of legal processes to 
audiences outside of Freetown, the capital).423  From these goals, policy makers in Sierra Leone 
hope to see updated and improved laws; availability of skills training and development 
opportunities for judges, lawyers, investigators, court administrators, and prison guards; and, 
finally, an increased public awareness and dialogue about criminal processes and the role they 
fulfill in post-conflict societies.424
A special tribunal might also help modernize potentially destructive cultural values.  
Most importantly, using law to characterize certain acts as criminal can legitimize certain legal 
values and criminalize others.  Criminalization, Kenneth Abbot argues, supports the penetration 
of international norms into national legal systems.425  Abbott argues that prosecutions of certain 
prominent figures might begin to change people’s perceptions of statehood and citizenship: 
“international legal institutions can be “teachers of norms,” shaping how governments and 
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citizens perceive particular conduct.”426  Thus, citizens would be encouraged to reshape their 
view of governance and the duties of states and citizens.
This criminalization process has been evident in movements to eradicate societies of 
harmful traditional practices.  Still, the concern that arises when considering changing cultural 
values is whether societies can transform harmful practices without destroying the culture itself.  
These questions were raised when Asian and African societies began to combat the widely 
known practice of female genital mutilation.427  As soon as civil society groups in these countries 
began to speak out against these practices and western countries began to publicize the wrongs of 
female genital mutilation, countries began to pass legislation or to ban the practice.428  For 
example, Côte d’Ivoire promised the United Nations in 1991 to use its existing criminal code to 
prohibit the practice and passed a law prohibiting it in 1998.429 In Sierra Leone, civil society 
groups hope that the Special Court will have an impact on death penalty law in Sierra Leone.430
Though movements to change harmful traditional practices have been criticized by arguments 
that espouse theories of cultural relativism, 431 these theories are problematic and can be just as 
paternalistic as those calling for the elimination of harmful cultural practices.  
One possible target area for a Special Court for Liberia is how Liberian warlords,
including Charles Taylor, sanctioned the use of traditional belief in witchcraft and secret 
societies to further ritual killings.  Sierra Leonean and other supporters of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone have credited the effort to address specific Sierra Leonean crimes for the way that 
426
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the court will help criminalize acts that once appeared legitimate to the Sierra Leonean 
society.432  The violence that occurred in Liberia took on a religious nature where murders were 
of a particular brutal and utterly unexplainable nature.433  Secret religious societies were a part of 
Liberian societies well before the coming of the Americo-Liberians in the 1800s.434  These 
ritualistic societies participated in ritual murder, provoking fear in both Americans and Liberians.  
Yet, over time, and upon realizing that this form of traditional religion could not be eradicated 
from society, Americo-Liberians and other politicians adopted these practices too.435  Presidents 
in Liberia consistently used religion as a way to justify certain public acts and to gain support of 
the leaders of the religious sects;436 the Doe regime condoned the use of religion as a tool for 
murder.437  Charles Taylor did the same.438  A special court for Liberia would be a fertile site to 
address these aspects of Liberian society because the Liberian national justice system does not 
have the capacity to address these aspects of Liberian society on its own.  
3.  The Role of International Involvement and Equal Attention to Crises of Similar Impact
Finally, arguments for promoting justice in Liberia extend beyond the simple notion that 
justice can contribute to ending the culture of impunity and the promotion of law reform in
African states. Given the similarity between the conflicts in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, some 
type of court must be established simply because these conflicts deserve equal treatment by the 
international community.  I devoted much of this Comment to describing the history of Sierra 
432 See, e.g., ICG, Promises and Pitfalls, supra note 411, at 14 (discussing the possibility of brining cases against 
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Leone and Liberia and their conflict and post-conflict situations.  This recounting is necessary to 
show the clear similarities and patterns in these conflicts.  Yet, despite the similarities, the UN 
has pushed for a court in Sierra Leone but has sanctioned lawlessness in Liberia.  
Arguably, the United Nations’ inconsistent application of its Chapter VII powers in 
deploying Humanitarian Intervention missions throughout the world also evidences this 
policy.439 Scholars have noted that interventions are not evenly deployed between oppressed 
white populations on the European continent and oppressed brown populations on other 
continents.440  The possible effect of this failure to commit to African crises in general and to the 
Liberian crisis in particular may be the primary hindrance to establishing a lasting peace.441
These same scholars suggest that, if the United Nations would establish a consistent
approach to humanitarian intervention-- an approach grounded in precedent-- it could solidify its 
legitimacy in the international community.442  Currently, inconsistent application of international 
policy sends the message that deviance in Africa will be more acceptable than deviant behavior 
in other conflict areas.443  For Liberia in particular, failure to demand accountability will send a 
mixed message to the states in the entire Mano River region; in this area of Africa where the 
conflicts have similar root causes and perpetrators operate across borders, violence will be 
sanctioned in some countries but not others. 
Again, I do not claim that setting up Special Courts will be the answer for each 
transitional context.  In Liberia, however, the context is ripe for this type of intervention.  The 
Peace Agreement process in Liberia consistently fails and consistently evades the basic problems 
439 Open Letter, supra note 386, at 494.  In many past conflicts, the crises were similar yet the UN humanitarian 
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of elite power in Liberia. 444 Even today, with the new peace agreement, the transitional 
government fails to prevent the spread of corruption and fiscal mismanagement.445 In fact, the 
transitional government, comprised of rebels-turned-politicians and wealth-opportunity-seeking
politicians, takes advantage of the absence of opposition and the ambiguity of the CPA to endow 
itself with powers beyond those granted in the Agreement.446 But this is nothing new in Liberia.
These crimes of impunity can be prosecuted through the process of an internationally 
supervised justice system.  The special court system recommended here would be a first step in 
acknowledging that Liberian leaders cannot continue to rule over Liberia without considering the 
needs of the Liberian people.  It is high time that the international community recognizes and 
defends the notion that there are limits to the exercise of state sovereignty.  Specifically, when a 
state can no longer function as a state because its overseers are the same actors who continuously 
act against the state’s very existence, the international community must demand that those state 
actors be held accountable for their acts.  None of the non-punitive mechanisms of transitional 
justice address these issues of state-sponsored violence, nor does a peace agreement that calls for 
power sharing with the same actors who benefit from state decay and forgiveness of the crimes 
they commit.
E.  Ensuring Legitimacy through a Strong U.S. Commitment to Liberia
I have argued that Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement is less than ideal because it 
hands over the Liberian state to rebel leaders through a blanket amnesty and refuses to confront 
Liberia’s culture of impunity.  In the spirit of optimism, however, Liberia still has a chance to 
redirect its efforts.  Liberia has failed, but it can recover with sufficient political will and targeted 
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and well-funded external aid.447  Rotberg suggests that a major power can play a key role in 
revitalizing a failed state in any of the following ways:  providing security, developing a 
rudimentary police force, training local officials across bureaucratic departments, and 
regularizing the local economies.448 It will not be enough, however, for a major power to be 
present to merely band-aid the problems of these countries.  Ensuring long-term peace, security 
and stability will require keeping in mind the long-term needs of these countries.  Most 
importantly, a guarantor can help maintain security throughout the country.  
The United States has a duty to encourage Liberia, like Sierra Leone, to take the extra 
step to prosecute the individuals most responsible for atrocities in Liberia as a first step on the 
road to ending the culture of impunity in Liberia. The United States has reason grounded in 
history and diplomacy to commit itself to lending a hand to Liberia.  
The United States’ decision whether to commit to ensuring a stable future for Liberia is
important because it will determine whether a Special Tribunal could ever be realistically 
implemented and whether Liberians would perceive it as a legitimate mechanism.  If the United 
States becomes involved in Liberia in a dedicated way, just as the British have involved 
themselves in Sierra Leone, the possibility for justice could be real.  The presence of a powerful 
United States would ensure financial backing for the court, and with enough troops on the 
ground, the security issue posed by the rebels would be resolved.  Furthermore, Liberians have 
expressed the need for U.S. commitment, more so than most African nations.449 O’Connell 
echoes this view when she argues that an international peacekeeping and reconstruction mission 
in Liberia, similar to those in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire under the United Kingdom’s and 
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France’s leaderships would seal the comprehensive effort to end war in West Africa.450  In fact, 
O’Connell argues that the United States is the only country that can end the war for good in 
Liberia because of the unique respect that the United States commands in Liberia.451  One way to 
ensure peaceful implementation of a court is through the assurance of adequate additional 
peacekeeping forces.  However, the number of American peacekeepers in Liberia is currently 
inadequate to maintain the fragile peace.452
The United States has continued to play an ambivalent and undecided role in Liberia.  For 
example, in the summer of 2003-when the international community was begging Charles Taylor 
to leave Liberia so that some type of peace could be achieved-U.S. and African newspapers had 
different accounts of how the United States should intervene in the Liberia crisis.453 Liberians 
saw clear reasons for a strong U.S. intervention, while official American policy on Liberia 
remained unclear throughout Liberia’s war.  After a small deployment of troops to Liberia, 
nothing more was heard of the United States’ plans for its future relationship with Africa’s oldest 
republic, despite how at other times in US-Liberia relations, the U.S. has vowed to remain a 
close ally to Liberia.454
American newspapers caught on and understood that unequal policies were being applied 
between Sierra Leone and Liberia.455 The fate of Liberia has been a direct product of Liberia's 
peculiar history.  As explained above, the British took the lead in corralling international 
intervention for Sierra Leone, its former colony.456 The French did the same for Cote d’Ivoire.457
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For nearly 150 years, Liberia remained a virtual American colony, and during the Cold War it 
ranked among Washington’s most useful allies.458 But the United States has never recognized 
itself as an imperial power, let alone a colonial one despite clear historical evidence attesting to 
the fact.459
Whether it desires to admit it or not, the United States has a historic connection to the 
Liberian nation.  The United States is constantly reminded of this relationship by the Liberian 
people and by members of the United States Congress, especially African-American members.460
Liberian heads of state clearly and continually have availed themselves of the unique historic fact 
that Liberia was an experiment in U.S. repatriation policy.461 Furthermore, Liberian people 
remained hopeful towards the end of the civil war that the United States would intervene on their 
behalf.462  This hope persisted as civil society groups in Liberia depended on the United States to 
play the lead role in intervention during Liberia’s transition period.463  Rebels in Liberia have 
even commented that they more willing lay down their arms if the United States asked them.464
Part of the Liberian people’s willingness to respect the force of the United States stems from the 
idea that the United States helped create the modern Liberian state. 465  These feelings and 
rationale for U.S. involvement have been echoed by some in the United States.466
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Despite the fact that some see the obvious role that the United States could and should 
play in Liberia, the official voice of U.S. policy in Liberia is ambivalent. On the one hand, 
members of the U.S. Department of State have stated clearly that the United States must play the 
lead in humanitarian assistance in Liberia.467  During a recent hearing on U.S. policy toward 
Liberia, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner stressed that America 
is willing to put American “boots on the ground” in Liberia, that it would project force when 
necessary, and that it would participate in diplomatic negotiation with rebel groups and tough 
governments.468  Kansteiner also acknowledged that security is key to Liberia’s transition and 
that ECOWAS was providing the forces to secure Liberia.469
On the other hand, President Bush’s policy in Liberia at the end of the war was to merely 
lend support to ECOWAS under certain conditions:  “the departure of Charles Taylor from office 
and from Liberia, a cease-fire between rebel groups and Liberian government forces, and the 
firm commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of the troops for 
any peacekeeping effort.” 470   The result of Bush’s policy was ECOWAS’ deployment of 
ECOMIL (Ecowas military mission to Liberia) instead of U.S. troops on the ground.471  In June 
2003, the Department of State sent 1,800 personnel offshore Liberia to assist if needed in 
securing the U.S. Embassy and evacuating Americans and foreign nationals due to the threat 
opposition and that only rebellion could oust him.  This continual support of corrupt leaders in Liberia might give 
the US some moral responsibility to provide a small portion of military and financial resources to help Liberia 
rebuild).
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posed by rebels.472  The largest contingency of American “boots on the ground” in Liberia was 
never more than the offshore, 2,100-person U.S.S. Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group.473
African-American members of Congress have continually highlighted the policy of the 
United States in refusing to deploy troops on the ground in Liberia despite United States’
economic, military, and political interests in Liberia since the beginning of 1822.474 They have 
often suggested that the United States has two policies-an Iraq policy and a Liberia (Africa) 
policy.475
I highlight the tensions in U.S. policy toward Liberia for several reasons, but primarily as 
a call to the United States to live up to its history in Liberia.  After all, Liberia is a part of 
America’s slave history.  There are other important reasons, however.  First, U.S. policy needs to 
be clarified.  It is clear that U.S. policy is inconsistent and that members of Congress and other 
branches of the U.S. government have wildly divergent views on how the United States should 
relate to Liberia. 476 Second, the disparity in U.S. policy in different countries should be 
recognized:  for example, the United States gives freely to development programs in Iraq but 
takes a blind stance in Liberia.477  Whereas the international community seems to be firmly 
dedicated to peace in Sierra Leone-- maintaining at least 13,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops to 
ensure the security of the Sierra Leonean people as the government there tries to implement their 
various transitional justice mechanisms-- there is no equal commitment to Liberia.478  In Sierra 
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Leone, just as in colonial times, and after Sierra Leone’s independence, the British have 
remained to aid the government in an advisory capacity. 479 Yet, Liberia finds itself in a 
precarious position with no superpower on which to lean because of its history of no official 
colonization.  
Contrary to popular opinion, the involvement of the United States in Liberia would not 
create huge costs for the United States.  Jamie O’Connell, law clerk to the Honorable James R. 
Browning, argues that U.S. leadership in the reconstruction of Liberia might actually lead to 
some political gains.480  O’Connell argues that U.S. leadership in Liberia would counter the view 
that the “U[.]S[.] shirks its international responsibilities.”481  O’Connell ultimately argues that a 
U.S. intervention in Liberia would require only modest military, economic, and political 
resources. 482 This would cost about $200 million per year for the first five years of 
reconstruction, and perhaps $100 million per year thereafter for 10 years-$1.5 billion over ten 
years.483  To get a sense of how small these figures are, O’Connell observes that the United 
States is spending $18.6 billion on reconstruction in Iraq, roughly $480 billion on defense and 
homeland security in 2004 and $5.4 trillion dollars from 2004 to 2013.484
In sum, sustainable nationbuilding demands more than a quick fix. It requires a long-
term commitment by outsiders to building capacities, strengthening security, and developing 
human resources. The uncomfortable but necessary lesson from Liberia’s partially effective 
attempts at rebuilding the Liberian state is that the revival of failed states will prove more 
successful if a regional or international organization or superpower takes charge of oversight and 
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financial support of the process, and only gradually relinquishing authority to a transitional 
administration.485
CONCLUSION
Liberia’s civil war is officially over, yet the war criminals are free and some are even 
helping run the transitional government under CPA authority.  Meanwhile, Charles Taylor 
relaxes in Nigeria’s resort city of Calabar. Sierra Leone’s brave step to implement the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone is commendable because it signals a desire to begin the transition to rule 
of law and the end of rule by impunity.  Sierra Leone can be a model for Liberia. It goes without 
saying that tribunals are not and should not be a substitute for early global intervention.  
Legal mechanisms do have their limits and cannot function alone. An effective atrocities 
regime must include institutions for monitoring abuses, conflict avoidance measures, sustainable 
peace, protection of minority rights, election supervision, and other functions. 486 Legal 
mechanisms will not work without strong political mechanisms and economic support to combat 
Africa’s post-colonial weak state syndrome.487 Still, by revisiting the colonial period and the 
growth of the post-colonial African political ruling style, we can see the growth of a culture of 
impunity. Rule by African elites without answering to their own people has directly caused a 
failure of their states. 
Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed state.  My goal has 
been to show that if the intervention of the transitional government of Liberia and the 
international community is at the level of the exercise of elite power instead of at the level of 
reconciliation among the masses (which is where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement focuses 
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its energies)-through the use of punitive mechanisms such as prosecution in a hybrid court of 
law, Liberia can begin to end the culture of impunity and ring in a sustainable peace.  
